4
In this essay, I seek to reconstruct the portrait of the committed observer by
commenting on Aron’s views on the role, virtues, limits, and possibility of moderation in
political life. My aim is not to offer an overview of Aron’s political philosophy,
something that has already been done well by other more competent interpreters of his
works.
2
I focus instead on the metaphor of the committed observer (spectateur engagé)
that was central to Aron’s understanding of political judgment and the relation between
politics and the life of the mind. Nonetheless, if Aron brilliantly played the role of a
spectateur engagé for more than four decades, he never gave a clear theoretical statement
regarding the main characteristics of the “committed observer” , something similar, say, to
Halifax’s The Character of a Trimmer. One has to reconstruct the portrait of the
committed observer piece by piece by using scattered insights from Aron’s own books in
which he described his own political engagement and commented on the shortcomings of
other forms of political engagement espoused by his colleagues. Among the clearly
identifiable features of Aron’s moderation are: reason, prudence, perceptive
understanding of the antinomies
3
of the political sphere, rejection of political prophecy,
opposition to determinism, and a distrust of any type of moral posturing. Aron’s
committed observer has a good knowledge of history, grasps the irreducibly complex
nature of politics, and is aware not only of the tragic nature of political events but also of
the inevitable plurality of social, moral, and political values and goods.
2
For two comprehensive exegeses of Aron, see Mahoney 1992 and Anderson 1997. An analysis of Aron’s
“morality of prudence” can be found in Mahoney 2001.
3
On this issue, see Anderson 1997, 139, 170-72.
Convention