Pluralism and Consensus in Political Deliberation
2
The problem with most resolutions of the tension between consensus and plurality is
that in the end they celebrate a particular kind of consensus, or a particular kind of
pluralism. Most theorists who have attempted to navigate this territory (notably,
Rawls and Habermas) have done so in empirically problematic ways that do not
correspond to what happens in real deliberations. In contrast, we will develop our
argument by looking at the production of consensus and plurality in the course of an
actual deliberative process. We intend to move beyond celebration (and any
corresponding critique) of the goal of consensus in order to develop a way of thinking
about the appropriate balance of consensus and pluralism in any particular political
situation. This balance will often involve pluralism in values, beliefs, and preferences
in the context of a meta-consensus on one or more of these three aspects — though the
way in which meta-consensus in terms of preferred outcomes is produced turns out to
require critical scrutiny.
Thus we attempt to push the matter beyond empirical observation of the outcomes of
deliberation on the one hand and theoretical stipulation on the other. While
recognizing the existence of deep plurality, we show that deliberation, rather than
imposing agreement amid plurality, can reveal underlying agreement that is otherwise
distorted by (non-deliberative) politics as usual. It follows that we should not equate
plurality with freedom and consensus with coercion. Sometimes plurality in preferred
course of action is the product of undemocratic processes which deliberation can
redress.
Rather than simply assert its positive or negative qualities, we believe that consensus
for its part needs to be broken down into its constituents based on the processes at
work when individuals arrive at positions — policy preferences — during particular
deliberations. Moreover, there is a need to make fine distinctions among different
kinds of consensus. Some conceptions of consensus proceed in terms of preference
aggregation, such that consensus connotes unanimity at the level of what is to be
done. However, consensus can also refer to the values and beliefs that help explain the
expression of particular preferences. Preferences, values, and beliefs alike can be
influenced by both decision procedures and political contexts. A simple model that
regards values and beliefs as the constituents of preferences has its uses. However, we
show that consensus in deliberative practice is in the end more satisfactorily analyzed
in terms of a model that grounds preference formation in a more rounded and holistic
Convention