2
In the summer of 2002, Israeli students took their final exams toward a high-school
diploma. At 17 or 18, just before gaining their voting rights and beginning their military
service, the civic studies exam confronted them with the question: “explain why
conscientious objection is subversive.”
The students were presented with the conclusion, veiling a demand to condemn soldiers
who refuse to serve in the occupied territories. At a culminating point of their civic
education, they were expected to explain why opposing the decisions of a democratic
government, in the context of war, is treacherous.
1
This article explores the normative role of civic education in responding to war,
and in preparing society for the possibility of peace. It starts out by describing changes in
the conceptualization of citizenship in times of conflict. During wartime, democratic
societies tend to transform their notion of citizenship to a militaristic one that is termed
here “belligerent citizenship”. This notion of citizenship reflects the militaristic
inclinations of society at war, and is made to support the public endurance in wartime.
However, it also hinders tolerance, marginalizes and silences various individuals and
groups, and impedes the consideration of alternative political futures.
Next, I examine the role of public education in response to these social
challenges. The case for an educational response to belligerent democracy is made from
various perspectives, and is situated within the contemporary theoretical discussion of
patriotic education. Based on Gutmann’s democratic education theory, I maintain that the
foremost role of public education is to foster basic democratic principles (such as equal
For many discussions on the topic, and suggestions on earlier drafts, I am grateful to Suzanne Dovi, Mariah
Zeisberg, and Eran Ben Porath. Meron Benvenisti has supported me through the writing of an earlier
version of this paper, and the participants of “The Morning After Peace” group have helped me clarify my
points on the topic. Another version of this paper was presented at the Annual meeting of the Philosophy of
Education Society (Miami 2003) and I thank the participants for their helpful comments.
1
The Israeli high court, in contrast, did recognize the history of political philosophical argumentations in
its verdict against selective conscientious objection. The judges referred to various perspectives, most
prominently to Michael Walzer (Obligations: Essay on Disobedience, War, and Citizenship 1970), to
conclude that selective objection was not acceptable in the Israeli military context. See High Court of
Justice case number 7622/02, October 23, 2002.
Convention