2
international criminal law, how is universal jurisdiction for crimes against humanity being
exercised? Are we able to provide justice to victims of crimes against humanity on the basis
of the mere humanity? Or do attempts to punish crimes against humanity face the same
problem that Hannah Arendt identified concerning the attempt to prevent crimes against
humanity, which is that “the Rights of Man, supposedly inalienable, proved to be
unenforceable”
3
? In cases of crimes against humanity, do victims and plaintiffs have to rely
on an effective citizenship, meaning membership in “a community willing and able to
guarantee any rights whatsoever”
4
?
Two basic paths for the prosecution of crimes against humanity abroad have
evolved: international tribunals and the emerging International Criminal Court (ICC), on the
one hand, and trials in third countries under universal jurisdiction, on the other hand. Since
the international tribunals ad hoc institutions with limited mandates, and the ICC has not
started its work yet, I will not examine this path. The second path for international justice is
prosecution in third countries. I will examine trials in third countries in order to assess the
current achievements and limits in prosecuting crimes against humanity. How did the courts
handle the issues of universal jurisdiction and crimes against humanity, and how can
universalistic and parochial factors explain the emergence and outcome of these particular
trials? By analyzing some of the few trial that took place, I will locate the mechanisms that
prevent numerous other cases of crimes against humanity from being prosecuted. The
broader question is whether crimes that are conceptualized as an offense to humanity at
large are coherently prosecuted through mechanisms that rely on states. ‘Crimes against
humanity’ are the supreme offense on paper. Yet the reliance on national courts often
3
Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism [1951] (San Diego & New York: Harcourt Brace & Company,
1973), 293.
4
Ibid., 297.