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rebutting the claims that the original position presupposes a metaphysical conception of the self that
views participants as independent of their situations and attachments, Rawls argues that when we think of
ourselves as in the original position, we are no more committed “to a particular metaphysical doctrine
about the nature of the self than our acting a part in a play, say of Macbeth or Lady Macbeth, commits us
to thinking that we are really a king or a queen engaged in a desperate struggle for political power” (1993,
27). While taking the lead in Shakespeare’s bloody play may not commit us to thinking we are actually a
Scottish nobleman lusting for power, it is hard to imagine us pulling off the part successfully unless we
are capable of seeing the world from Macbeth’s point of view. Without empathy, our career of crying
“Out, damn spot” would certainly be short-lived
. Rawls argues that a society of fair cooperation “involves
the idea of fair terms of cooperation: these are the terms that each participant may reasonably accept,
provided that everyone else likewise accepts them” (1993, 16). The point of the original position is to
illuminate these terms of cooperation, but without the ability to empathize with others, it would be
impossible for participants in the original position to figure out exactly what terms each participant “may
reasonably accept.”
In addition to the role of empathy in the original position, empathy also connects with Rawls’s
conception of political virtue; here we see a more explicit connection with democratic education. Since
political liberalism rejects any comprehensive doctrine as its guiding force, it is no surprise that Rawls
argues that “justice as fairness does not seek to cultivate the distinctive virtues and values of the
liberalisms of autonomy and individuality, or indeed of any other comprehensive doctrine” (1993, 200).
Instead, education should focus only on political values, those that are part of the overlapping consensus,
and thus should concentrate on children’s place as future citizens. Part of this focus includes “developing
the political virtues” (Rawls 1993, 200), and as with Dagger’s republican liberalism, empirical evidence
allows us to connect these virtues with empathy. “The virtues of political cooperation that make a
constitutional regime possible are, then, very great virtues. I mean, for example, the virtues of tolerance
and being ready to meet others halfway, and the virtue of reasonableness and the sense of fairness”
(Rawls 1993, 157). Empathic citizens are much more likely to demonstrate tolerance, and because they
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