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order that is not just an improvement over relying solely on the mechanism of individual
self-help, but one that is profoundly different and uniquely legitimate in its nature. This
is in stark contrast to the understanding of political institutions found in Hobbes and
Locke, figures whose influence on international relations scholarship has tended to be
much greater. For both Hobbes and Locke, political institutions are to be understood as
simply tools for achieving order (albeit, in Locke’s case, with respect for human rights
being part of what is meant by “order”). This means that there is nothing particularly
significant about institutionalized forms of order, nor any reason why arguments used to
justify domestic institutions would necessarily carry over to the case in favor of
international institutions, given the many structural differences between the domestic
state of nature and the international one. The suggestion that I hope the analysis provided
here has at least put on the table is that, in thinking about international institutions, we
would do well to pay attention to those theorists in our tradition who have looked not
simply at what political institutions can accomplish, but at the moral significance of the
specific way they accomplish what they can accomplish as well. Doing so, stands to
deepen our appreciation of the range of values at stake in the debate over
internationalism.
Convention