9
As Bernard Williams argues, “In the scheme of Kantian oppositions, shame is on
the bad side of all the lines. This is well brought out in its notorious association with the
notion of losing or saving face. “Face” stands for appearance against reality and the outer
versus the inner, so its values are superficial; I lose face or save it only in the eyes of
others, so the values are heteronomous; it is simply my face to save or lose, so they are
egoistic.”
7
Shame then would seem to be the emotion that psychologically compels us to
conform to public opinion in pursuit of our own advantage. And this advantage consists
of avoiding the painful feelings of being ashamed in front of others and the pleasures of
social approbation and deference. Indeed a number of theorists of shame have suggested
that this emotion is the primary one for enforcing compliance or conformity to social
norms, even though the feeling of shame itself is rarely visible or is only felt by the
person when his behavior comes into conflict with these norms.
8
And from this Kantian
perspective an emotion like guilt comes across as a much more autonomous, rational and
morally salutary emotion. In following our conscience we are following the dictates of
an internal guide, which, as evidenced by the very notion of conscientious objection, can
lead one to oppose public opinion and stand firm in the face of ridicule, contempt or
shame.
But Williams goes on to show how superficial this distinction between shame and
guilt really is by showing that shame itself, both for the ancient Greeks and for ourselves
7
Williams, Bernard, Shame and Necessity (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), p. 78.
8
Scheff, Thomas, “Shame and Conformity: The Deference-Emotion System” in American Sociological
Review53, Issue 3, (June,1988): 395-406; Helen B. Lewis, Shame and Guilt in Neurosis (New York:
International Universities Press, 1971) ; Helen M. Lynd, Shame and the Search for Identity (New York:
Harcourt Brace, 1958).
Convention