Author's Keywords: central banks, inflation, careers, principal-agent	Convention All Academic Convention is the premier solution for your association's abstract management solutions needs. Submission - Custom fields, multiple submission types, tracks, audio visual, multiple upload formats, automatic conversion to pdf. Review - Peer Review, Bulk reviewer assignment, bulk emails, ranking, z-score statistics, and multiple worksheets! Reports - Many standard and custom reports generated while you wait. Print programs with participant indexes, event grids, and more! Scheduling - Flexible and convenient grid scheduling within rooms and buildings. Conflict checking and advanced filtering. Communication - Bulk email tools to help your administrators send reminders and responses. Use form letters, a message center, and much more! Management - Search tools, duplicate people management, editing tools, submission transfers, many tools to manage a variety of conference management headaches! Click here for more information.
Association: Name: American Political Science Association URL: http://www.apsanet.org
Citation: URL: http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p63829_index.html Direct Link: HTML Code:

Adolph, Christopher. "Paper Autonomy, Private Ambition: Theory and Evidence Linking Central Bankers' Careers and the Economy" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Philadelphia Marriott Hotel, Philadelphia, PA, Aug 27, 2003 <Not Available>. 2009-05-26 <http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p63829_index.html>

Adolph, C. , 2003-08-27 "Paper Autonomy, Private Ambition: Theory and Evidence Linking Central Bankers' Careers and the Economy" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Philadelphia Marriott Hotel, Philadelphia, PA Online <.PDF>. 2009-05-26 from http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p63829_index.html

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript Review Method: Peer Reviewed Abstract: Central bankers' careers are shown to influence inflation outcomes. I present two theories in which careers explain central bank behavior, develop them in a game theoretic model, and test them using a comprehensive new data set of central bankers' career backgrounds which spans twenty rich democracies and half a century. Career experiences vary considerably over this sample, and not only mould beliefs about appropriate policy (the socialization hypothesis), but also shape career concerns for central bankers who seek career advancement in either the financial sector or government (the career incentives hypothesis). Accordingly, time series cross-section analysis of inflation shows central bankers with financial sector backgrounds preside over lower inflation, while central bankers with bureaucratic experience produce higher inflation. The magnitude of career effects on inflation is on par with standard measures of central bank independence, and interactive models suggest both socialization and incentives contribute to these career effects. The study of central banks in particular and bureaucracy in general should pay greater attention to individual preferences and their interaction with organizations; institutions alone are not enough.

Career Patterns of Public Managers with Private Sector Work Experience: Description and Implications

Principal or Agent Theory Applied to the European Union Model of Governance: The Case of the Common Foreign Security Policy

The Real Effects of CentralBankers' Preferences: Central Bankers' Careers, Labor MarketInstitutions, and Unemployment

The impact of government on nonprofit sector- An agent based model