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Universalism within Districts: Distributive Politics Under the SNTV Electoral Rule in Japan
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Universalism within Districts: Distributive Politics
Under the SNTV Electoral Rule in Japan
∗
Yusaku Horiuchi
†
Last Updated: July 9, 2003
Abstract
Do political system and electoral institutions shape processes and outcomes of dis-
tributive politics? I examine this question by focusing on Japan. By consideringincentive mechanisms under Japan’s parliamentary government system and the singlenon-transferable vote (SNTV) electoral rule, I present two hypotheses: Districts withmore powerful members of the ruling coalition receive a larger amount of grants; butmembers of the opposition share distributive benefits within each district. I call thesecond hypothesis, which is my main theoretical focus, “universalism within districts,”a variant of universalism widely discussed in the literature of distributive politics. Acomparison of per capita intergovernmental subsidies for specific projects in FY1994(compiled by the non-LDP coalition) and FY1995 (compiled by the LDP coalition)suggests that these hypotheses are highly valid. I conclude that institutions do matter,and call for further comparative institutional analysis of distributive politics.
1
Introduction
Is distributive policy (e.g., governmental expenditures for geographically concentrated pub-lic projects or programs) influenced by political actors who seek their electoral and policybenefits? If it is, to what extent, and in what way, does politics matter? Over the pastthree decades, a number of political scientists, as well as scholars of public choice and publicadministration, have examined these questions, presented various formal theoretical models(e.g., Cox and McCubbins 1986; Dixit and Londregan 1995, 1996, 1998; Fiorina 1981; Gross-man 1994; Lindbeck and Weibull 1987; Niou and Ordeshook 1985; Shepsle and Weingast1981; Weingast 1979; Weingast, Shepsle and Johnsen 1981), and empirically tested manyobservable implications, which are derived from these formal models or other models (e.g.,
∗
This paper is prepared for delivery at an East Asian Institute seminar, Singapore, 8 August 2003; the
Third International Convention of Asian Scholars, Singapore, 19-22 August 2003; and the 2003 AnnualMeeting of the American Political Science Association, Philadelphia, 28-31 August 2003. Copyright by theAmerican Political Science Association. The author gratefully acknowledges the financial support from theFaculty of Arts and Social Sciences at the National University of Singapore.
†
Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, National University of Singapore. Block AS1, Level
4, 11 Arts Link, Singapore 117570. e-mail: ## email not listed ##
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| | Authors: Horiuchi, Yusaku. |
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Universalism within Districts: Distributive Politics
Under the SNTV Electoral Rule in Japan
∗
Yusaku Horiuchi
†
Last Updated: July 9, 2003
Abstract
Do political system and electoral institutions shape processes and outcomes of dis-
tributive politics? I examine this question by focusing on Japan. By considering
incentive mechanisms under Japan’s parliamentary government system and the single
non-transferable vote (SNTV) electoral rule, I present two hypotheses: Districts with
more powerful members of the ruling coalition receive a larger amount of grants; but
members of the opposition share distributive benefits within each district. I call the
second hypothesis, which is my main theoretical focus, “universalism within districts,”
a variant of universalism widely discussed in the literature of distributive politics. A
comparison of per capita intergovernmental subsidies for specific projects in FY1994
(compiled by the non-LDP coalition) and FY1995 (compiled by the LDP coalition)
suggests that these hypotheses are highly valid. I conclude that institutions do matter,
and call for further comparative institutional analysis of distributive politics.
1
Introduction
Is distributive policy (e.g., governmental expenditures for geographically concentrated pub-
lic projects or programs) influenced by political actors who seek their electoral and policy
benefits? If it is, to what extent, and in what way, does politics matter? Over the past
three decades, a number of political scientists, as well as scholars of public choice and public
administration, have examined these questions, presented various formal theoretical models
(e.g., Cox and McCubbins 1986; Dixit and Londregan 1995, 1996, 1998; Fiorina 1981; Gross-
man 1994; Lindbeck and Weibull 1987; Niou and Ordeshook 1985; Shepsle and Weingast
1981; Weingast 1979; Weingast, Shepsle and Johnsen 1981), and empirically tested many
observable implications, which are derived from these formal models or other models (e.g.,
∗
This paper is prepared for delivery at an East Asian Institute seminar, Singapore, 8 August 2003; the
Third International Convention of Asian Scholars, Singapore, 19-22 August 2003; and the 2003 Annual
Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Philadelphia, 28-31 August 2003. Copyright by the
American Political Science Association. The author gratefully acknowledges the financial support from the
Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences at the National University of Singapore.
†
Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, National University of Singapore. Block AS1, Level
4, 11 Arts Link, Singapore 117570. e-mail: ## email not listed ##
1
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