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Universalism within Districts: Distributive Politics Under the SNTV Electoral Rule in Japan
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grants. Empirical analysis in this paper strongly supports this hypothesis. I also found thatthe first hypothesis is empirically robust. Politicians’ personal experiences, positions andnetworks affect distributive outcomes, if they are in the ruling coalition.
These results have some broader theoretical implications. First, and most importantly,
the findings suggest that institutions do indeed matter in shaping the processes and outcomesof distributive politics. Previous studies of distributive politics have paid attention almostexclusively on American politics, but we need more comparative institutional analysis ofdistributive politics. Such comparative studies are expected not only to improve our under-standings of the fundamental questions regarding politics–who gets what, why and how –butalso to facilitate debates concerning how to design institutional rules to minimize politicalbias of distributive policy and maximize more efficient allocation of public resources.
Second, in the literature of Japanese politics, scholars and journalists have traditionally
argued that unelected bureaucrats dominate policy-making processes (e.g., Johnson 1982;Lincoln 2001). Recent studies, however, suggest that elected politicians do influence policyand budget making processes (e.g., Calder 1988; McCubbins and Noble 1995; Ramseyer andRosenbluth 1993). This paper’s findings support the latter argument and bring politics backin the studies of Japanese political economy.
Third, although these recent studies of Japanese politics shed light on the important
roles of politics in policy-making, political “actors” they focus are almost always the LDP,its factions or its members. What the literature has not discussed much is the role of theopposition in policy-making. This paper shows that the opposition are effectively in theprocess of pork-barreling. We need more studies on how the opposition influence policy-making and budget-making in Japan.
Although this paper has these theoretical contributions to the literature, it also exhibits
some limitations and unanswered questions. First, this study focuses on the particular periodin contemporary history of Japanese politics. From the 1993 Lower House election (underthe old electoral system) to the 1996 Lower House election (under the new electoral system),Japanese politics drastically changed in a number of aspects. Many new parties emerged,merged with one another, and were eliminated. After Hosokawa, almost all leaders formedcoalition governments, unlike the single-party dominant governments from 1955 to 1993.Among else, the LDP was in the “opposition” camp from August 1993 to June 1994. Thus,one may argue that the positive correlation between the opposition’s seat share and the percapita subsidies comes form this period specificity. Whether my theoretical arguments arevalid during the “normal” period under the SNTV system is a matter of debate. Since paststudies show similar positive correlations, we believe that “universalism within districts” iswidely valid under the SNTV rule. But more empirical studies on this point are required.
How did the electoral reform change the processes and outcomes of distributive politics
in Japan? This is the second highly-relevant question remaining. Under the new electoralsystem, there is only a single representative in each district. As far as these single-memberdistricts are concerned, I expect that the norm of universalism within districts is not applica-ble. The new electoral system, however, also elects representatives from regional proportionalrepresentation (PR) blocks. This PR portion may let the opposition still in sharing distribu-tive benefits. Horiuchi and Saito’s (N.d.) findings are relevant to examine the relationshipbetween distributive outcomes and the electoral reform. They show that the LDP seat shareis negative from 1991 to 1996 but positive in 1997 and 1998. This indicates that the elec-
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| | Authors: Horiuchi, Yusaku. |
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grants. Empirical analysis in this paper strongly supports this hypothesis. I also found that
the first hypothesis is empirically robust. Politicians’ personal experiences, positions and
networks affect distributive outcomes, if they are in the ruling coalition.
These results have some broader theoretical implications. First, and most importantly,
the findings suggest that institutions do indeed matter in shaping the processes and outcomes
of distributive politics. Previous studies of distributive politics have paid attention almost
exclusively on American politics, but we need more comparative institutional analysis of
distributive politics. Such comparative studies are expected not only to improve our under-
standings of the fundamental questions regarding politics–who gets what, why and how –but
also to facilitate debates concerning how to design institutional rules to minimize political
bias of distributive policy and maximize more efficient allocation of public resources.
Second, in the literature of Japanese politics, scholars and journalists have traditionally
argued that unelected bureaucrats dominate policy-making processes (e.g., Johnson 1982;
Lincoln 2001). Recent studies, however, suggest that elected politicians do influence policy
and budget making processes (e.g., Calder 1988; McCubbins and Noble 1995; Ramseyer and
Rosenbluth 1993). This paper’s findings support the latter argument and bring politics back
in the studies of Japanese political economy.
Third, although these recent studies of Japanese politics shed light on the important
roles of politics in policy-making, political “actors” they focus are almost always the LDP,
its factions or its members. What the literature has not discussed much is the role of the
opposition in policy-making. This paper shows that the opposition are effectively in the
process of pork-barreling. We need more studies on how the opposition influence policy-
making and budget-making in Japan.
Although this paper has these theoretical contributions to the literature, it also exhibits
some limitations and unanswered questions. First, this study focuses on the particular period
in contemporary history of Japanese politics. From the 1993 Lower House election (under
the old electoral system) to the 1996 Lower House election (under the new electoral system),
Japanese politics drastically changed in a number of aspects. Many new parties emerged,
merged with one another, and were eliminated. After Hosokawa, almost all leaders formed
coalition governments, unlike the single-party dominant governments from 1955 to 1993.
Among else, the LDP was in the “opposition” camp from August 1993 to June 1994. Thus,
one may argue that the positive correlation between the opposition’s seat share and the per
capita subsidies comes form this period specificity. Whether my theoretical arguments are
valid during the “normal” period under the SNTV system is a matter of debate. Since past
studies show similar positive correlations, we believe that “universalism within districts” is
widely valid under the SNTV rule. But more empirical studies on this point are required.
How did the electoral reform change the processes and outcomes of distributive politics
in Japan? This is the second highly-relevant question remaining. Under the new electoral
system, there is only a single representative in each district. As far as these single-member
districts are concerned, I expect that the norm of universalism within districts is not applica-
ble. The new electoral system, however, also elects representatives from regional proportional
representation (PR) blocks. This PR portion may let the opposition still in sharing distribu-
tive benefits. Horiuchi and Saito’s (N.d.) findings are relevant to examine the relationship
between distributive outcomes and the electoral reform. They show that the LDP seat share
is negative from 1991 to 1996 but positive in 1997 and 1998. This indicates that the elec-
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