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Universalism within Districts: Distributive Politics Under the SNTV Electoral Rule in Japan
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Balla, Lawrence, Maltzman and Sigelman 2002; Bungey, Grossman and Kenyon 1991; Carseyand Rundquist 1999a, 1999b; Case 2001; Choi, Turner and Volden 2002; Cingranelli 1981;Dahlberg and Johansson 2002; Duffin 1999; Grossman 1994; Hird 1991; Johansson 2003; Lee1998, 2000; Levitt and Snyder 1995; McGillivray 1997; Rich 1989; Rundquist, Lee and Rhee1996; Stein and Bickers 1994; Treisman 1996; Worthington and Dollery 1998; Wright 1974).
As most of these studies are aimed to explain distributive policy and politics in the
United States, however, they often, implicitly or explicitly, assume political processes underparticular settings: The government structure is presidential and two political parties com-pete for legislative seats under the single-member plurality electoral system. But how doesthe nature of distributive politics change if different electoral and political systems are used?Do political system and electoral institutions shape processes and outcomes of distributivepolitics? These questions have been rarely examined in the existing literature of distributivepolitics.
1
This paper examines these questions by focusing on Japan. Japan is different from the
U.S. in that the government structure is parliamentary, not presidential. More importantly,to elect the members of the House of Representatives, Japan used the single non-transferablevote (SNTV) system with multi-member districts (MMD) from 1925 to 1993.
2
This elec-
toral rule is said to produce distinctively different incentive mechanisms than those underthe first-past-the-post system. Previous studies indeed show that the SNTV rule is cru-cially important for understanding political behavior and outcomes in Japan, South Koreaand Taiwan (e.g., Grofman et al, eds. 1999; Horiuchi 2001; Kohno 1997; Ramseyer andRosenbluth 1993). Some of these behavior and outcomes may seem, at a glance, odd andcounter-intuitive to students of American politics (e.g., Horiuchi 2001). Therefore, althoughSNTV is by no means a representative of many different electoral systems used in democra-cies around the world, I argue that examining distributive politics under the SNTV rule helpsus formulate alternative hypotheses and, furthermore, paves the way for the development ofcomparative institutional analysis of distributive politics.
To study distributive politics in Japan, I use intergovernmental grants from the central to
municipal governments for specific projects (Kokko Shishutsukin). Providing such project-based specific grants across local governments is a traditional example of distributive policies,policies that “are characterized by the ease with which they can be disaggregated and dis-pensed unit by small unit, each unit more or less in isolation from other units and fromany general rule” (Lowi 1964, 690).
3
Such intergovernmental expenditures cover projects
1
There are some exceptions. Ames (1995, 336) briefly argues different natures of credit-claiming in multi-
member district systems, such as the open-list proportional representation system used in Brazil. McCubbinsand Rosenbluth (1995) examine budgetary processes under the single non-transferable vote system in Japan.Thies (1998) studies how electoral rules and other institutional settings mediate urbanization into changesin agricultural subsidy programs in Japan and the U.S.
2
The 1946 election, the first election under the U.S. occupation, was held under a large-district, propor-
tional representation electoral system. Except for this, the SNTV-MMD system was used for nearly seventyyears in Japan’s Lower House.
3
How to define “distributive” policy, in differentiating from regulatory or redistributive policy, is impor-
tant, though somewhat controversial, because models of distributive politics and their applicability dependon the definition of distributive policy. Weingast (1994) suggests four requirements, but Bickers and Stein(1994) argue that only two of them are consistent with Lowi’s traditional understandings of distributivepolicies. These two requirements are that “projects [are] local in nature and [are] independently variable
2
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| | Authors: Horiuchi, Yusaku. |
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Balla, Lawrence, Maltzman and Sigelman 2002; Bungey, Grossman and Kenyon 1991; Carsey
and Rundquist 1999a, 1999b; Case 2001; Choi, Turner and Volden 2002; Cingranelli 1981;
Dahlberg and Johansson 2002; Duffin 1999; Grossman 1994; Hird 1991; Johansson 2003; Lee
1998, 2000; Levitt and Snyder 1995; McGillivray 1997; Rich 1989; Rundquist, Lee and Rhee
1996; Stein and Bickers 1994; Treisman 1996; Worthington and Dollery 1998; Wright 1974).
As most of these studies are aimed to explain distributive policy and politics in the
United States, however, they often, implicitly or explicitly, assume political processes under
particular settings: The government structure is presidential and two political parties com-
pete for legislative seats under the single-member plurality electoral system. But how does
the nature of distributive politics change if different electoral and political systems are used?
Do political system and electoral institutions shape processes and outcomes of distributive
politics? These questions have been rarely examined in the existing literature of distributive
politics.
1
This paper examines these questions by focusing on Japan. Japan is different from the
U.S. in that the government structure is parliamentary, not presidential. More importantly,
to elect the members of the House of Representatives, Japan used the single non-transferable
vote (SNTV) system with multi-member districts (MMD) from 1925 to 1993.
2
This elec-
toral rule is said to produce distinctively different incentive mechanisms than those under
the first-past-the-post system. Previous studies indeed show that the SNTV rule is cru-
cially important for understanding political behavior and outcomes in Japan, South Korea
and Taiwan (e.g., Grofman et al, eds. 1999; Horiuchi 2001; Kohno 1997; Ramseyer and
Rosenbluth 1993). Some of these behavior and outcomes may seem, at a glance, odd and
counter-intuitive to students of American politics (e.g., Horiuchi 2001). Therefore, although
SNTV is by no means a representative of many different electoral systems used in democra-
cies around the world, I argue that examining distributive politics under the SNTV rule helps
us formulate alternative hypotheses and, furthermore, paves the way for the development of
comparative institutional analysis of distributive politics.
To study distributive politics in Japan, I use intergovernmental grants from the central to
municipal governments for specific projects (Kokko Shishutsukin). Providing such project-
based specific grants across local governments is a traditional example of distributive policies,
policies that “are characterized by the ease with which they can be disaggregated and dis-
pensed unit by small unit, each unit more or less in isolation from other units and from
any general rule” (Lowi 1964, 690).
3
Such intergovernmental expenditures cover projects
1
There are some exceptions. Ames (1995, 336) briefly argues different natures of credit-claiming in multi-
member district systems, such as the open-list proportional representation system used in Brazil. McCubbins
and Rosenbluth (1995) examine budgetary processes under the single non-transferable vote system in Japan.
Thies (1998) studies how electoral rules and other institutional settings mediate urbanization into changes
in agricultural subsidy programs in Japan and the U.S.
2
The 1946 election, the first election under the U.S. occupation, was held under a large-district, propor-
tional representation electoral system. Except for this, the SNTV-MMD system was used for nearly seventy
years in Japan’s Lower House.
3
How to define “distributive” policy, in differentiating from regulatory or redistributive policy, is impor-
tant, though somewhat controversial, because models of distributive politics and their applicability depend
on the definition of distributive policy. Weingast (1994) suggests four requirements, but Bickers and Stein
(1994) argue that only two of them are consistent with Lowi’s traditional understandings of distributive
policies. These two requirements are that “projects [are] local in nature and [are] independently variable
2
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