8
We evaluate our expectations against a structural equation model. We
then examine individual cases and outliers to substantiate our conclusions.
III. RESULTS
Figure 1 estimates a structural equation model for socialist party
orientation. The results are robust across the two time points for which we have
data and are consistent with some, but not all, of the expectations set out above.
[Figure 1 about here]
Electoral representation has no significant effect on socialist party
orientation, either in bivariate analysis, or under controls. While Przeworski
makes the general claim that electoral participation affected socialist party
orientation, he does not attempt to show that the relative timing of participation
(or representation) has a marginal effect. We find little evidence for this, either in
quantitative analysis or in case study. It is possible that we have
misconceptualized or misspecified this hypothesis – possibilities that we will
explore in a later draft of this paper. For the time being, and for the remainder of
this paper, we put this hypothesis aside.
We are unable to specify structural factors that capture—in non-
tautological fashion— the potential for socialist party-political coalition making.
Again, we intend to return to this topic in revision of this paper, and put it aside
here.
We estimate Status rigidity to have only a weak direct effect on socialist
party orientation, although it has a strong indirect effect via Civil liberties.
Civil liberties—freedom of the press, association, and combination—is by
far the most influential variable in our analysis. Alone, it accounts for an
estimated 60 percent of variance in socialist party orientation, and it remains
strong and significant under controls. The estimated effects of Manhood suffrage
and Union links are also strong and significant. As we expect, less rigid status
cleavages are associated with earlier civil liberties, and the earlier civil liberties
were established, the earlier manhood suffrage was granted and the greater the
influence of trade unions on socialist parties.
These results are derived from a relatively small number of cases. The
drawback is that this limits the comprehensiveness and reliability of quantitative
analysis. The advantage of a small-n study is that one can engage individual
cases —and this is what we do in the remainder of this paper.
One can gain an idea of the relative explanatory power of the timing of
civil liberties and of manhood suffrage by examining Figure 2, which plots Civil
liberties against the year in which manhood suffrage was granted. The cross hairs
distinguish four categories:
•
late
civil liberty, late manhood suffrage: Russia, Finland, Spain, Italy, Austria-
Hungary. In these countries civil liberties were late or very late (in Austria-
Hungary from 1867; in Russia not prior to 1914) and in none of these
countries was manhood suffrage granted until the twentieth century.
Convention