Anderson/Doherty 19
Anti-Fusion Provisions. Proceeding to the auxiliary provisions generates different expectations in the
context of our hypotheses. Anti-fusion laws were, arguably, retaliatory measures intended to stifle third
party influence. As such, under the traditional account, we would expect to see very few of them
because the core ballot laws, representing a near coup against the major parties by the Progressives and
third parties, would have weakened the major parties substantially enough to prevent anti- fusion laws
from passing. To the extent that they did appear, this account would predict that strong third party or
out party influence would effectively forestall anti-fusion laws in the face of a weak in-party presence.
In contrast, the revisionist school asserts that the two major parties retained such strength that third party
influence was not enough to block anti-fusion laws. In fact, where third parties were more prevalent,
anti-fusion laws would be more relevant and their presence more likely.
The figure below illustrates regional and partisan trends for the adoption of anti-fusion laws.
Not many were passed, and most states that passed them were in the Midwest. There is no apparent
difference in the composite indices for states that passed them and those that did not; however, there is a
clear difference in the average percent control variable – states passing anti-fusion laws had higher
average control scores with a seven percent difference in the upper house and a ten percent difference in
the lower house. This effect is particularly strong in the Midwest, where the majority of the laws were
passed.
Convention