Anderson/Doherty 2
responsiveness of the electoral system. This widely accepted view provides little detail about the
partisan dynamics underpinning the adoption of Australian ballot laws.
2
Alternatively, revisionist scholars argue that many state party leaders actually supported the
adoption of the Australian ballot laws. They did so in an attempt to wrest power from autonomous local
party leaders and to head off growing challenges from third parties. Forming coalitions with reformers,
they manipulated ballot reform to their advantage and the final ballot law in each state reflected the
various needs and interests of these alliances of strange bedfellows. Most studies along these lines have
been written by political historians who focus on individual states.
3
Our goal is to examine systematically the partisan dynamics in the 42 states that passed
Australian ballot laws between 1888 and 1910. We generate hypotheses based on these competing
schools of thought, and evaluate which approach, if any, is supported by the evidence. We conclude
that the evidence is mixed, lending support in most instances to the traditional school of thought and in
others to the revisionist approach. This suggests that there is no one simple story behind ballot reform;
thus, our study both attempts to answer questions about the nature of ballot reform and suggests
directions for further research.
To support our conclusions, we will: (1) explore the historical context and nature of ballot
reform laws; (2) situate our study in the literature on the adoption of Australian ballot laws; (3) set forth
hypotheses based on the two competing schools of thought; (4) explain our methodology and detail our
findings; and (5) discuss the implications of our study and directions for further research.
Historical Context
The Progressive Era is often associated by political scientists and historians with a significant
shift in the electoral process as a whole and, in particular, the role of the major party organizations in
1
Dana, 1892.
2
L. Reynolds, 1995.
3
Ibid.
Convention