Anderson/Doherty 9
We expect to be able to draw more conclusions about the partisan dynamics behind the adoption of the
auxiliary provisions of ballot laws--anti- fusion laws, straight-ticket voting provisions, and ballot format-
-which varied greatly across states.
We employ three indicators of partisan dynamics—two gauge the strength of the dominant party
in each state over the years preceding passage of ballot reform and one measures third party strength.
The first measure of dominant party strength consists of a composite index score whereby the years of
consecutive one-party control over the six years prior to the passage of the core or auxiliary provision
are aggregated for each branch of government. A state for which the Republican Party, for example, had
six consecutive years of control over the governorship and both houses of the state legislature, would
yield the maximum score of 18. We use this score to evaluate the degree to which either party had
entrenched control of the state government. The second measure of dominant party strength uses the
first measure, but moves beyond identifying the years of consecutive control to calculate the average
percent control of that party over the years of consecutive control. While the first measure may identify
which party tended to prevail during the period in question, the second measure assesses the degree of
strength of that party.
The third party measure simply looks at the level of third party influence over both houses of the
state legislature. We did this in order to discern major party competition from possible alliances
between the two major parties against any third parties. Below we set forth general hypotheses about
what we would expect the data to show in accordance with the traditional and revisionist accounts of
ballot reform.
18
L. Reynolds 9-10.
Convention