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Veto Players in Presidential Regimes
Unformatted Document Text:  Veto Players in Presidential Regimes: Institutional Variables and Policy Change Aníbal Pérez-Liñán (## email not listed ##) Juan Carlos Rodríguez-Raga (## email not listed ##) Department of Political Science University of Pittsburgh 4L01 W.W. Posvar Hall Pittsburgh., PA 15260 This paper develops a computational model to expand the theory of veto players into the realm of presidential regimes. We bridge two strands in the study of comparative institutions: the work on veto players in parliamentary systems and the analysis of executive-legislative relations under presidentialism. In the first part of the paper we introduce the basic concepts and outline the setup for the analysis. Section two explores the relationship between the legislative powers of the president and the configuration of veto players in presidential regimes. Section three discusses how the number of legislative parties and their internal cohesion affect policy stability. In the fourth section, we develop a computational model to estimate the simultaneous impact of these factors in a conventional two-dimensional policy space. The results suggest that constitutional decree authority is a key factor explaining policy stability in presidential regimes, and that the impact of most institutional variables is conditional on the policy position of the key players. Prepared for delivery at the 2003 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Philadelphia, August 28-31. Authors’ names are in alphabetical order. We are indebted to Mark P. Jones for his valuable comments. Replication dataset and codes are available upon request.

Authors: Perez-Linan, Anibal. and Rodríguez-Raga, Juan Carlos.
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Veto Players in Presidential Regimes:
Institutional Variables and Policy Change
Aníbal Pérez-Liñán (## email not listed ##)
Juan Carlos Rodríguez-Raga (## email not listed ##)
Department of Political Science
University of Pittsburgh
4L01 W.W. Posvar Hall
Pittsburgh., PA 15260
This paper develops a computational model to expand the theory of veto players into the
realm of presidential regimes. We bridge two strands in the study of comparative
institutions: the work on veto players in parliamentary systems and the analysis of
executive-legislative relations under presidentialism. In the first part of the paper we
introduce the basic concepts and outline the setup for the analysis. Section two explores
the relationship between the legislative powers of the president and the configuration of
veto players in presidential regimes. Section three discusses how the number of
legislative parties and their internal cohesion affect policy stability. In the fourth section,
we develop a computational model to estimate the simultaneous impact of these factors in
a conventional two-dimensional policy space. The results suggest that constitutional
decree authority is a key factor explaining policy stability in presidential regimes, and
that the impact of most institutional variables is conditional on the policy position of the
key players.
Prepared for delivery at the 2003 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science
Association, Philadelphia, August 28-31. Authors’ names are in alphabetical order. We
are indebted to Mark P. Jones for his valuable comments. Replication dataset and codes
are available upon request.


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