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have significant influences on the extent and structure of the informal institutions of the
economy of affection. Furthermore, these effects are often indirect or unintended. For
scholars, this suggests that our current theories of institutions should not only begin to
include an analysis of the informal, but also investigate the interaction between formal
and informal institutions. For policymakers, this means that a cost-benefit analysis of
any potential public policy should include a consideration of how this policy might shape
and interact with the informal institutions of the economy of affection.
The need to recognize the above two points is particularly urgent given the social
implications of the massive AIDS epidemic in Africa. While reliable rates of AIDS
infection are difficult to obtain
, the data does suggest that the trend in AIDS infection is
highest for adults in their prime earning years (Bell, Devarajan and Gersbach 2003). The
loss of the most productive members of the economy of affection to AIDS weakens social
networks just at the time that needs are growing greater. This means that the sick have
fewer sources of support for their care; orphaned children may never be educated or even
fostered; and the elderly have fewer younger family members to support them in their old
age. The loss of one AIDS victim’s life is magnified as it ripples through the economy of
affection, affecting the short and long-term prospects of their parents, extended family,
friends, and most of all, their children, who probably get less food, health care, schooling
and love than before. The potential loss of production to African governments from
AIDS thus extends across social networks and across generations, threatening to
undermine Africa’s already troubled development prospects (World Bank 2003).
Despite donor pressures to reduce public service provision and trim budgets,
African governments must be aware of the real limitations of the informal social security
Convention