(Page 9 of 25) - Bargaining for Democracy: Labor Unions and Democratic Consolidation in Spain authored by Royo, Sebastian.

By the 1970s other constituencies, including influential industrialists, were also pushing for a radical

reform of the political and industrial relations system. In a new economic context the legalistic and
paternalistic foundations of the authoritarian regime hindered any rapid response on the part of the
employers to the changing conditions of the market and the economic crisis, and the dominant role played
by the state in industrial relations and economic issues. Many of them concluded that in this new
environment the authoritarian regime could no longer guarantee continued profits.

The assassination by ETA in 1973 of Franco's designated successor, Admiral Carrero Blanco, hindered

the prospects for the continuation of the regime. In response, the government decided to resort to greater
repression, which intensified social tensions. By the end of 1975 it became clear that Spain faced the
dilemma of breaking with its old regime or reform it. New union elections took place in 1975 in this
increasingly uncertain environment. In an effort to unify the opposition groups, Comisiones Obreras
launched an electoral platform called the Candidaturas Unitarias y Democraticas (CUD), which attracted
the support of almost all the labor groups in opposition with the exception of the Unión General de
Trabajadores (UGT), the Socialist Union, which maintained a strategy of abstention in the elections. The
CUD won an easy victory in the two phases of the election in most regions and factories at the local level.
This success was replicated by other organizations promoting democracy in sectors in which the CUD did
not have a strong base—i.e., teachers, journalists, health services, water, gas, and electricity. At the highest
levels of the OSE hierarchy, however, a complex system of indirect election ensured the victory of the
bureaucracy. The performance of the opposition vindicated the decision to participate in the elections and
to do so together. These elections marked the highest period of unity within the labor movement.

Franco's death in November 20, 1975 altered the political landscape. A sharp increase in the costs of

living followed by a new decree imposing another wage freeze led to a dramatic increase in social unrest.
The numbers of workers who took strike actions quadrupled and during the first months of 1976
unprecedented massive demonstrations took place in the major cities, including Madrid, Bilbao, and
Barcelona. The government responded with some timid measures of reform and stepped up repression.
However, its failure to contain growing unrest helped to swing increasing numbers of people behind the
reform of the system.

It is for this reason that the new Spanish democracy cannot be understood without reference to the mass

pressure for change from below. Indeed some scholars have stressed that “no amount of political
engineering could have persuaded influential sectors of the oligarchy and the Francoist establishment to
renounce what it had been for decades a profitable political system…it was the destabilizing effect of
public agitation and the threat of declining profit margins that pushed the oligarchy to seek finally to bring
Spain's polity into line with that of Western democracies.” (Balfour 1989, 220; see also Fishman 1990 and
Collier 1999). Indeed, by 1976 the system had proved incapable of dealing with the mounting crisis that
affected all sectors of society, an in particular it had failed to respond to the increasing challenge of public
order, which had deteriorated markedly as a result of mass demonstrations in the streets, ETA's terrorist
actions, and the right-wing backlash. At the same time, the system of industrial relations, which had been
one of the cornerstones of the authoritarian regime, did not worked anymore. Wages were increasing faster
than productivity, and the rigidity of the labor market undermined the employers’ efforts to deal with the
growing crisis (Perez-Díaz 1980, 33).

The extent of political reform was also influenced by the success (or lack thereof) of mass pressures.

For instance the limited response to calls for action in late 1975 and 1976 suggests that most workers felt
that their demands would be better satisfied in a process of compromise and reform that in mass actions
that threatened to plunge the country into total chaos--and maybe a new civil war. The failure to move
forward in the democratization process, however, would have led to a radicalization of demands. The
passivity of the population was explained by four main factors (Balfour 1989, 221-22). First, the new
regime had built among large sectors of the population a strong sense of consensus-as proved by the 1966
referendum of political reform. At the same time, the social and economic reforms of the 1960s had
transformed the political passions that characterized Spain before the Civil War, and had given way to new
values characterized by individualism. In addition, the material progress showcased by the regime media
had created an apolitical society, and the tacit social contract, which provided workers with job security and
legal protection against employers, also contributed to this passivity. A final factor was that the social and
economic transformation of 1960s and 1970s had created a new complex working class with moderated
political aspirations, a development that was underestimated by the Left. As we mentioned before the main
reason behind mobilizations were not so much political reasons but a reaction against the police's brutality,
or in response to local problems and specific conjunctures (see Pérez-Díaz 1979 and 1980).