 |
Decentralization, Legislative Institutions and Particularistic Spending
| |
| | Unformatted Document Text:
Version 8.3 August 25, 2003
Fiscal decentralization, legislative institutions and particularistic
spending
Alberto Diaz-Cayeros
Kenneth M. McElwain
Vidal F. Romero
Konrad A. Siewierski
1
ABSTRACT This paper examines the determinants of particularistic spending, the regularly observed phenomenon of government overspending on geographically targeted projects, where the projects’ costs are shared across territorial jurisdictions. We propose that government capital expenditures can provide a measure of the degree of particularism (i.e. “pork”) characterizing a country’s public spending. Particularism tends to be higher when local revenue collection is centralized, but expenditure is decentralized. When only a small proportion of local spending is financed by local revenue, politicians are able to transfer the costs of expensive projects to other localities, and fiscal discipline is weak. Some institutional features mitigate while others exacerbate the political incentives to overspend. When incumbent legislators do not electorally compete with each other – for example, in single-member districts – there are fewer checks on log-roll spending, and capital expenditures are high. Institutions such as unicameralism and parliamentarism reduce capital expenditures, since they limit the number of independently elected politicians that must assuage their constituents through particularistic projects.
Keywords: particularism, pork, single member districts, public spending, decentralization,
law of 1/n.
Paper prepared for the 2003 Meeting of the American Political Science Association Meeting,
Philadelphia, August 28-31.
1
Stanford University, Department of Political Science; Diaz-Cayeros is also adjunct professor of Political
Science at the Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México. Funding by the Stanford Institute for the Quantitative Study of Society (SIQSS) is gratefully acknowledged. We thank Jessica Seddon Wallack, Scott Morgenstern, Neal Beck, Dan Posner, David Laitin, Beatriz Magaloni and participants at the Stanford Comparative Politics Seminar and in the Conference on Comparative Analysis of Political Institutions at Princeton University for comments and critiques on earlier drafts. Of course, all errors remain our responsibility.
|
| | Authors: Diaz-Cayeros, Alberto., McElwain, Kenneth., Romero, Vidal. and Siewierski, Konrad. |
|
| |
|
|
Version 8.3
August 25, 2003
Fiscal decentralization, legislative institutions and particularistic
spending
Alberto Diaz-Cayeros
Kenneth M. McElwain
Vidal F. Romero
Konrad A. Siewierski
1
ABSTRACT
This paper examines the determinants of particularistic spending, the regularly observed
phenomenon of government overspending on geographically targeted projects, where the
projects’ costs are shared across territorial jurisdictions. We propose that government capital
expenditures can provide a measure of the degree of particularism (i.e. “pork”) characterizing
a country’s public spending. Particularism tends to be higher when local revenue collection is
centralized, but expenditure is decentralized. When only a small proportion of local spending
is financed by local revenue, politicians are able to transfer the costs of expensive projects to
other localities, and fiscal discipline is weak. Some institutional features mitigate while others
exacerbate the political incentives to overspend. When incumbent legislators do not
electorally compete with each other – for example, in single-member districts – there are
fewer checks on log-roll spending, and capital expenditures are high. Institutions such as
unicameralism and parliamentarism reduce capital expenditures, since they limit the number
of independently elected politicians that must assuage their constituents through
particularistic projects.
Keywords: particularism, pork, single member districts, public spending, decentralization,
law of 1/n.
Paper prepared for the 2003 Meeting of the American Political Science Association Meeting,
Philadelphia, August 28-31.
1
Stanford University, Department of Political Science; Diaz-Cayeros is also adjunct professor of Political
Science at the Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México. Funding by the Stanford Institute for the
Quantitative Study of Society (SIQSS) is gratefully acknowledged. We thank Jessica Seddon Wallack, Scott
Morgenstern, Neal Beck, Dan Posner, David Laitin, Beatriz Magaloni and participants at the Stanford
Comparative Politics Seminar and in the Conference on Comparative Analysis of Political Institutions at
Princeton University for comments and critiques on earlier drafts. Of course, all errors remain our responsibility.
|
|
 Convention | | All Academic Convention is the premier solution for your association's abstract management solutions needs. | | Submission - Custom fields, multiple submission types, tracks, audio visual, multiple upload formats, automatic conversion to pdf. | | Review - Peer Review, Bulk reviewer assignment, bulk emails, ranking, z-score statistics, and multiple worksheets! | | Reports - Many standard and custom reports generated while you wait. Print programs with participant indexes, event grids, and more! | | Scheduling - Flexible and convenient grid scheduling within rooms and buildings. Conflict checking and advanced filtering. | | Communication - Bulk email tools to help your administrators send reminders and responses. Use form letters, a message center, and much more! | | Management - Search tools, duplicate people management, editing tools, submission transfers, many tools to manage a variety of conference management headaches! | | Click here for more information. |
|
|
|
| |
|
|
|
Page 1 of 32 
