mainstream right parties.
Thus, we would hypothesize that when rightist parties are in power
immediately before an election, nationalist parties are less able to capture vote share.
Concomitantly, when centrist parties are in power prior to an election, we would expect
nationalist and right wing parties to capture more votes because the fringes of the political spectrum
are unoccupied. The rise of Le Pen in 2002 best illustrates this dynamic. A common interpretation
of Le Pen’s strong showing in the presidential election holds that the move by both the center-right
Gaullist party and the center-left Socialists to the middle of the political spectrum vacated space at
the edges of the political spectrum. The National Front stepped into this empty ideological void on
the right side of the spectrum and was able to capitalize on the disaffection of voters who believed
that the traditional center-right party had moved too far to the center. We therefore hypothesize
that when centrist parties are in power prior to an election, nationalist parties are better able to
attract electoral support.
S
OCIAL
C
ONDITIONS
Along with economic conditions, the other category of variable that receives considerable
attention from both scholars and the mainstream media are social conditions; within this category,
the presence or absence of significant minority populations is key. The rationale for emphasizing
social diversity (or homogeneity) is addressed below.
A number of right-wing nationalist parties have explicitly based their appeals to voters on
diversity, building platforms organized around severe restrictions of immigration (usually from non-
European countries of origin), repatriation of minorities, and negative portrayals of national
minorities, like Jews and Roma (Krell, Nicklas, and Osterman 1996; Maddens, Billiet, and Beerten
2000). These groups have also linked popular worries over crime rates, drug trafficking, and
2
At the same time, we might the relationship between a rightist incumbent party and a right-wing nationalist party to be
more pronounced than the relationship between a rightist incumbent party and other types of nationalist parties;
minority nationalist parties, liberal nationalist parties and others that lack a right-wing ideology may not benefit nor lose
much in the way of vote share if the incumbent sits on the right of the ideological spectrum. Rightist parties would be
less likely to co-opt these parties’ political agendas, and so voters casting ballots would be able to differentiate rightist
mainstream parties from these liberal and minority nationalist parties much more easily, as well as discern the
considerably different programmatic appeals made by each. As a result, the relationship between a rightist incumbent
party and nationalist parties could be more complex than if we considered only the relationship between incumbents and
the radical right.
3
By fear of religious intolerance, we refer to cases in which nationalist parties play on a public fear that certain minority
groups, specifically Muslim communities, will encourage the growth of Islamic fundamentalism that sits uncomfortably
with existing western values and mores.
8
Convention