6
that they can prosper as independent trading units in an increasingly integrated world trading system, then
the incentives for secession, and ethnic conflict, increase. Their argument is based on a Downsian analysis
of actors’ political preferences. If individuals are uniformly distributed on an ideological segment, so that
the larger the country, then the larger the average distance between the common policy adopted and each
individual’s preferred policy. Following the premises of the Median Voter Theorem, it becomes
increasingly hard for the state to maintain its unity because the individuals who are consistently ignored in
the formulation of policy will seek to secede, if they can prosper in the international economy and if the
costs of secession are not exorbitantly high.
7
Alternatively, the greater the level of trade integration
among countries, which is one of the most important aspects of economic liberalization,
8
the smaller the
level of protectionism, and consequently the greater the costs of remaining within a large and regionally-
stratified state for an affluent region, in terms of income and productivity levels. Hudson Meadwell and
Pierre Martin agree and argue that free trade reduces the ethnic group’s short-term transition costs to
independence and thus lowers the barriers to exit.
9
Put more succinctly, since “trade liberalization and
average country size are inversely related, [then] the ‘globalization’ of markets goes hand in hand with
political separatism”
10
This line of theoretical argumentation is based on a series of empirical works as well as on a
series of theoretical assumptions.
11
The crux of this empirical work is that increased trade integration
leads to higher levels of economic growth, a reduction in the size of the government and an increased
level of pressure by voters for a reformulation of the mechanisms for the provision of public goods, i.e.
the affluent regions of the multiethnic state will no longer want to subsidize the poorer ones. The
theoretical assumptions have to do with the modeling of the extent of the effect of asset price changes,
which is magnified by the increased integration of the multiethnic state in the international economy, on
political action.
Much like the work of Ronald Rogowski and Jeffrey Frieden and Rogowski, Alesina et al.
assume that increases in the level of trade integration -- implying changes in the relative prices of the
factors of production-- lead to changes in the preferences of political actors.
12
Political actors derive their
preferences from their economic interests that are a function of their production profile. Assuming a
territorial concentration of ethnic groups, then the affluent regions of a multi-ethnic state will be hard
pressed not to support secession. Not only can they prosper, but also they can avoid subsidizing other
6
See Alesina et al. (1997,1).
7
This argument by Alesina et al (1997, 13) is based on Alesina and Spolaore (1997).
8
This indicator of economic liberalization is an important but it is not the only one, nor is it the most representative one.
9
See Meadwell and Martin 1996 (75-76).
10
See Alesina et al. 1997 (26).
11
In terms of empirical works it is based on Sachs and Warner (1995), Ades and Glaeser (1994) and Alesina and Wacziag
(1997).
12
See Rogowski (1989) as well as Frieden and Rogowski (1996).
Convention