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DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTION BUILDING IN LATIN AMERICA: EFFECTS OF JUDICIAL REFORMS ON STATE ACCOUNTABILITY
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D
EMOCRATIC
I
NSTITUTION
B
UILDING
I
N
L
ATIN
A
MERICA
:
E
FFECTS OF
J
UDICIAL
R
EFORMS ON
S
TATE
A
CCOUNTABILITY
By
María Inclán
Political Science Department,
Pennsylvania State University,
112 Burrowes Building, University Park, PA 16802,
## email not listed ##
Silvia Inclán
Political Science Department,
Boston University,
232 Bay State Road 2
nd
Floor, Boston, MA, 02215,
## email not listed ##
Abstract
The judiciary, as guardian of all established laws has a fundamental role in the establishment and preservation or the rule of law and hence on the process of democratization, which it can only honor if free from manipulation by state and other powerful actors. Scholars and politicians have hence claimed for judicial independence as an important safeguard for newly democratizing nations. This paper studies the implications on state accountability of recent judicial reform efforts made by Latin American countries to grant their judicial branches increased independence. The aim of this paper is to further understanding of the extent to which judicial reforms influence the submission of the state to the law and democratic consolidation. It offers a regression analysis of the effects of reforms in thirteen reforming and ten non-reforming countries on horizontal and vertical accountability over a 29-year period (1973-2001) using indicators by the Polity Project. Drawing on its results, this paper argues that despite the still too long and embarrassing list of abuses documented in the literature as impeding the achievement of the rule of law, the introduction of constitutional safeguards for judicial independence has had a positive effect in enhancing state accountability. While not perhaps a sufficient condition for the rule of law, judicial reforms may be a necessary and important one.
Paper prepared for delivery at the 2003 Annual Meeting of the American Political
Science Association, August 28- August 31, 2003.
Copyright by the American Political Science Association.
We would like to thank Lee Ann Banaszak, Michael Bernhard, Gretchen Casper, Michael
Ebeid, and Quan Li for their insightful comments and suggestions on previous revisions of this work.
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| | Authors: Inclan, Maria. and Inclan, Silvia. |
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D
EMOCRATIC
I
NSTITUTION
B
UILDING
I
N
L
ATIN
A
MERICA
:
E
FFECTS OF
J
UDICIAL
R
EFORMS ON
S
TATE
A
CCOUNTABILITY
By
María Inclán
Political Science Department,
Pennsylvania State University,
112 Burrowes Building, University Park, PA 16802,
## email not listed ##
Silvia Inclán
Political Science Department,
Boston University,
232 Bay State Road 2
nd
Floor, Boston, MA, 02215,
## email not listed ##
Abstract
The judiciary, as guardian of all established laws has a fundamental role in the
establishment and preservation or the rule of law and hence on the process of
democratization, which it can only honor if free from manipulation by state and other
powerful actors. Scholars and politicians have hence claimed for judicial
independence as an important safeguard for newly democratizing nations. This paper
studies the implications on state accountability of recent judicial reform efforts made
by Latin American countries to grant their judicial branches increased independence.
The aim of this paper is to further understanding of the extent to which judicial
reforms influence the submission of the state to the law and democratic consolidation.
It offers a regression analysis of the effects of reforms in thirteen reforming and ten
non-reforming countries on horizontal and vertical accountability over a 29-year
period (1973-2001) using indicators by the Polity Project. Drawing on its results, this
paper argues that despite the still too long and embarrassing list of abuses
documented in the literature as impeding the achievement of the rule of law, the
introduction of constitutional safeguards for judicial independence has had a positive
effect in enhancing state accountability. While not perhaps a sufficient condition for
the rule of law, judicial reforms may be a necessary and important one.
Paper prepared for delivery at the 2003 Annual Meeting of the American Political
Science Association, August 28- August 31, 2003.
Copyright by the American Political Science Association.
We would like to thank Lee Ann Banaszak, Michael Bernhard, Gretchen Casper, Michael
Ebeid, and Quan Li for their insightful comments and suggestions on previous revisions of
this work.
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