All Academic, Inc. Research Logo

Info/CitationFAQResearchAll Academic Inc.
Document

A Continuous Schumpeterian Conception of Democracy
Unformatted Document Text:  18 • Where there is a high probability of contestation through elections – and the results of elections are likely to be upheld – civil conflict is accommodated through peaceful means and civil war is unlikely. • Civil war is most likely to occur in political systems where there is a mid- level probability of contestation through elections, and the same mid- level probability that the results of elections will be subverted. Under these uncertain conditions, civil war is likely to erupt. The ideal measure to test this story is the estimated probability that key offices will be filled through contested elections – the continuous Schumpeterian conception of democracy. Table 4 presents these results using the six specifications of the probability of democracy from Table 2. Note that with my conception of democracy, I employ estimates – not measurements – as a variable. Recall that this is because probability of democracy cannot be observed, only estimated. While both estimates and measurements involve error, the errors are of a different nature. Along with each estimate is a degree of uncertainty, captured by the standard errors in Table 2. To account for this, I employed the following method. 17 First, using Clarify software (King et al. 2000), I sampled from the distribution of coefficients from the Table 2 probit estimates of the determinants of democracy. I did so 10 times to generate 10 different estimates of the probability of democracy (for each of the six specifications). Next, I included alternatively the 10 different estimates of the probability of democracy in the estimation of incidence of civil war. The coefficients for the 10 different trials were then averaged to produced the coefficients reported in Table 4. The standard errors were also averaged and then adjusted for the fact that the coefficients from different trials have different standard errors. 18 This procedure was repeated separately for each of the six specifications of democracy from Table 2. 17 The method follows King et al. (2001). I am grateful to Ken Scheve and Mike Tomz for their help in explaining the procedure. 18 The formula for the adjustment is found in King et al. (2001), p53, equation 3.

Authors: Vreeland, James.
first   previous   Page 19 of 23   next   last



background image
18
Where there is a high probability of contestation through elections – and the
results of elections are likely to be upheld – civil conflict is accommodated
through peaceful means and civil war is unlikely.
Civil war is most likely to occur in political systems where there is a mid- level
probability of contestation through elections, and the same mid- level probability
that the results of elections will be subverted. Under these uncertain conditions,
civil war is likely to erupt.

The ideal measure to test this story is the estimated probability that key offices
will be filled through contested elections – the continuous Schumpeterian conception of
democracy. Table 4 presents these results using the six specifications of the probability of
democracy from Table 2. Note that with my conception of democracy, I employ
estimates – not measurements – as a variable. Recall that this is because probability of
democracy cannot be observed, only estimated. While both estimates and measurements
involve error, the errors are of a different nature. Along with each estimate is a degree of
uncertainty, captured by the standard errors in Table 2.

To account for this, I employed the following method.
17
First, using Clarify
software (King et al. 2000), I sampled from the distribution of coefficients from the Table
2 probit estimates of the determinants of democracy. I did so 10 times to generate 10
different estimates of the probability of democracy (for each of the six specifications).
Next, I included alternatively the 10 different estimates of the probability of democracy
in the estimation of incidence of civil war. The coefficients for the 10 different trials were
then averaged to produced the coefficients reported in Table 4. The standard errors were
also averaged and then adjusted for the fact that the coefficients from different trials have
different standard errors.
18
This procedure was repeated separately for each of the six
specifications of democracy from Table 2.
17
The method follows King et al. (2001). I am grateful to Ken Scheve and Mike Tomz
for their help in explaining the procedure.
18
The formula for the adjustment is found in King et al. (2001), p53, equation 3.


Convention
All Academic Convention can solve the abstract management needs for any association's annual meeting.
Submission - Custom fields, multiple submission types, tracks, audio visual, multiple upload formats, automatic conversion to pdf.
Review - Peer Review, Bulk reviewer assignment, bulk emails, ranking, z-score statistics, and multiple worksheets!
Reports - Many standard and custom reports generated while you wait. Print programs with participant indexes, event grids, and more!
Scheduling - Flexible and convenient grid scheduling within rooms and buildings. Conflict checking and advanced filtering.
Communication - Bulk email tools to help your administrators send reminders and responses. Use form letters, a message center, and much more!
Management - Search tools, duplicate people management, editing tools, submission transfers, many tools to manage a variety of conference management headaches!
Click here for more information.

first   previous   Page 19 of 23   next   last

©2008 All Academic, Inc.