18
Another option would be to introduce a majority (single member) electoral system at the
local level. Such a system tends to promote both of the constructive effects of party
competition that were noted above. It usually produces (1) well-established parties –
normally just two big parties – which are involved (2) in fierce electoral competition. As we
saw above, such conditions tend to breed accountability. On the other hand, the proportional
system tends to give a better representation of different political views in society. For this
reason, this system is held to be more suitable for societies that are divided along ethnic and
religious lines – especially if there is a multitude of such divisions (Lijphart 1999). Hence,
to decide the matter we have to determine which is the most serious problem. If it is
accountability – signified by a growing distance between voters and representatives – then
the majority model would be the natural answer.
South Africa uses a mixed electoral system in local elections: 50 % of the representatives
are returned in proportional elections, 50 % in majority elections. At the same time parties
are fairly centralised. As in the Bolivian case, this could indeed be seen as a mixed blessing.
On the positive side, it was the party leadership after all – not the party unit on the ground –
that estranged the political rogues in Cape Town and Ekhureleni. Yet, it could be argued
that the introduction of a recall system and a 100 % majoritarian electoral system would
strengthen the accountability function of elections even more.
7
These two mechanisms
combine well, as the majority system is the most suitable for the application of a recall
institution. India has a majority system. This is in some states combined with recall. The
effects of this institution, in a Third World context, merit further inquiry.
So much for the representative – electoral – form of local democracy. As stated above, there
is reason to complement this form with other modes of influence.
As we have seen, public meetings (or public hearings) – implying direct participation by
the local population – play a significant role in India and Bolivia. These can be activated in
the planning process (to lay down priorities), but can also serve as instruments of social
auditing, that is, to engage ordinary citizens in the scrutiny of ongoing programmes. So far
these attempts have had mixed results. Public meetings can sometimes energise local
politics as people come there to speak their minds and engage in active communication with
7
In his country report, Robert Cameron makes exactly this claim.
Convention