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Association: Name: American Political Science Association URL: http://www.apsanet.org
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Colomer, Josep. "Separate Electoral Rules for Good Governance" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Philadelphia Marriott Hotel, Philadelphia, PA, Aug 27, 2003 <Not Available>. 2009-05-26 <http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p64049_index.html>

Colomer, J. , 2003-08-27 "Separate Electoral Rules for Good Governance" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Philadelphia Marriott Hotel, Philadelphia, PA Online <.PDF>. 2009-05-26 from http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p64049_index.html

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript Review Method: Peer Reviewed Abstract: In order to evaluate the performance of different electoral rules in regimes of division of powers, I adopt the criterion that policy outcomes coinciding with the median voter's preference can produce highest satisfaction or social utility. The best results should be expected from median voter's Presidents whose party is also the median voter's and median legislator's party in Congress. From this perspective, proportional representation in Congress can be very appropriate since it tends to establish a close correspondence between the median party's and the median voter's preferences. For presidential elections, absolute majority or qualified-plurality rules with a second round tend to produce higher frequency of median voter's Presidents than simple plurality rule. However, since presidential rules are always majoritarian because they have to produce a single absolute winner, they tend to induce the formation of a lower number of candidacies than in congressional elections, thus making possible that the median voter's party in Congress does not coincide with the median voter's President, even in concurrent elections. This disparity makes cooperation between the President and the median party in Congress more difficult for both legislative decisions and Cabinet formation. An empirical survey of electoral rules and results in Latin America during the present democratic periods allows us to evaluate the performance of different electoral rules according to the criteria previously discussed.

Strategic voting in legislative majority runoff elections in a semi-presidential system. The 2007 French legislative elections

Plurality versus Majority Runoff Rules for the Election of the President in Latin America: Insights from the 2006 Peruvian and Mexican Elections

Designing or Reforming Electoral Systems: Who Adopts Proportional Representative (or Majority Plurality) System, and Why?