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Cabinet Formation in Presidential Regimes.
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Cabinet Formation in Presidential Regimes
This version: August 22, 2003
Octavio Amorim Neto
Graduate School of Economics
Getulio Vargas Foundation
Praia de Botafogo 190 sala 820
Rio de Janeiro, RJ 22253-900
Brazil
E-mail: ## email not listed ##
Abstract
This paper proposes a decision-theoretic model to explain how cabinets help presidents implement their policy-making strategies. Presidents are assumed to have two key policy-making strategies available: to seek a statutory implementation of policy goals or a decree-based one. If the institutional and political incentives faced by the president favor a statutory strategy, he is more likely to select partisan ministers rather than non-partisans, distribute portfolios on a proportional basis, and appoint a majority cabinet. Econometric analysis of 106 cabinets appointed by 59 presidents in 13 countries of the Americas from the late 1970s to 2000 demonstrates that (1) the percent of non-partisan cabinet ministers is affected by the size of the president’s party, extremist presidents, the extension of the president’s veto and decree powers, the elapsing of the president’s term, and economic crises; (2) that proportionality in portfolio allocation is a function of the size of the president’s party, extremist presidents, and economic crises; and (3) that the key determinants of the legislative status of presidential cabinets are the size of the president’s party, extremist presidents, and economic crises.
Paper prepared for presentation at the 2003 annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Philadelphia, PA. Copyright by the American Political Science Association.The author thanks Juliana Estrella, Lourenço Senne, and Marina Vivas for their excellent research assistance, and acknowledges support from the Brazilian Institute of Economics (IBRE) at the Getulio Vargas Foundation, Rio de Janeiro.The following people kindly provided cabinet appointment data: David Altman, John Carey, Antônio Octavio Cintra, Eduardo Dockendorff, Luciano Dias, Eduardo Gamarra, Maria Escobar-Lemmon, Barbara Geddes, Lisa Hilbink, Daniel Kaufman, Fabrice Lehoucq, Flavio Machicado, René Mayorga, Carlos D. Mesa Gisbert, Ana Maria Mustapic, Patricio Navia, Antonio Ortiz Mena, Monica Pachón, Judith Schultz, and Michelle Taylor-Robinson.
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| | Authors: Amorim Neto, Octavio. |
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Cabinet Formation in Presidential Regimes
This version: August 22, 2003
Octavio Amorim Neto
Graduate School of Economics
Getulio Vargas Foundation
Praia de Botafogo 190 sala 820
Rio de Janeiro, RJ 22253-900
Brazil
E-mail: ## email not listed ##
Abstract
This paper proposes a decision-theoretic model to explain how cabinets help presidents
implement their policy-making strategies. Presidents are assumed to have two key policy-
making strategies available: to seek a statutory implementation of policy goals or a
decree-based one. If the institutional and political incentives faced by the president favor
a statutory strategy, he is more likely to select partisan ministers rather than non-
partisans, distribute portfolios on a proportional basis, and appoint a majority cabinet.
Econometric analysis of 106 cabinets appointed by 59 presidents in 13 countries of the
Americas from the late 1970s to 2000 demonstrates that (1) the percent of non-partisan
cabinet ministers is affected by the size of the president’s party, extremist presidents, the
extension of the president’s veto and decree powers, the elapsing of the president’s term,
and economic crises; (2) that proportionality in portfolio allocation is a function of the
size of the president’s party, extremist presidents, and economic crises; and (3) that the
key determinants of the legislative status of presidential cabinets are the size of the
president’s party, extremist presidents, and economic crises.
Paper prepared for presentation at the 2003 annual meeting of the American Political
Science Association, Philadelphia, PA. Copyright by the American Political Science
Association.
The author thanks Juliana Estrella, Lourenço Senne, and Marina Vivas for their excellent
research assistance, and acknowledges support from the Brazilian Institute of Economics
(IBRE) at the Getulio Vargas Foundation, Rio de Janeiro.
The following people kindly provided cabinet appointment data: David Altman, John
Carey, Antônio Octavio Cintra, Eduardo Dockendorff, Luciano Dias, Eduardo Gamarra,
Maria Escobar-Lemmon, Barbara Geddes, Lisa Hilbink, Daniel Kaufman, Fabrice
Lehoucq, Flavio Machicado, René Mayorga, Carlos D. Mesa Gisbert, Ana Maria
Mustapic, Patricio Navia, Antonio Ortiz Mena, Monica Pachón, Judith Schultz, and
Michelle Taylor-Robinson.
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