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Abstract
The intention of this paper is to compare two institutional approaches to public policy making
and to evaluate their usefulness in explaining and understanding contemporary reforms in
advanced European welfare states. I argue that both approaches, i.e. the veto player (Tsebelis
2002) and veto point (Immergut 1992) approach, are not two sides of the same coin.
Common features render the question of institutional (or rather: constitutional) configurations
that make policy changes less likely. But differences entail the conceptualization of the
decisive political actors, the importance of societal interests in political decision-making, the
perception of the nature of politics, and, finally, the intended theoretical ambition. I discuss
these conceptual differences and outline the research consequences implied with each
approach. In the empirical part of the paper both approaches are applied on the basis of case
studies of contemporary reform patterns in the Dutch, Swedish and German welfare states.
Taken together, I argue that the veto point framework is more efficient for a grounded
explanation of reform patterns, as it facilitates the researcher to empirically investigate the
political actors’ strategies, goals and incentives to utilize specific veto points, i.e. it facilitates
the researcher not to deduce but to detect the specific veto strategies of political actors.
Hence, we should resist the temptation to hastily replace empirical processes by (in most
cases) invalid variables and empirical ‘crutches’.
Convention