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1 Introduction
One of the leading questions in contemporary research concerns the extent to which
institutions determine, shape or influence the capability of political actors to push through
reforms in advanced welfare states. Besides the blame avoidance approach that centers on
party politics and strategic decisions of party elites in a competitive framework (Weaver
1986; Pierson 1994, 1996), the veto player (Tsebelis 2002) or veto point (Immergut 1992)
approaches are currently the most popular analytical frameworks that may provide possible
explanations for divergent reform patterns, for reform success or reform failure. As both
approaches focus on institutional conditions for policy change, hence, this paper tries to
explore if and how institutional approaches may enhance our understanding of contemporary
reform patterns in European welfare states.
In this paper, I will investigate in detail the explanatory power of the veto player and veto
point approaches, their appropriateness, merits and disadvantages, i.e. the fruitfulness of these
distinct institutional approaches. Therefore, I compare as a first step both ‘theories’. In
contrast to mainstream views in the prevailing literature, I argue that both approaches are
quite different research approaches. Commonalities render the question of institutional (or
better: constitutional) configurations that make policy changes less likely. But differences
entail the conceptualization of the decisive political actors, the importance of societal interests
in political decision-making, the perception of the nature of politics, and, finally, the intended
theoretical ambition.
Secondly, I will apply both ‘theories’ to three empirical case studies of welfare state reforms
in the Netherlands, Sweden, and Germany. I argue that both approaches should not be
considered as ‘theories’, but rather as analytical approaches that direct the researcher to
certain observations, while at the same time obscuring – as a consequence – other empirical
facts. It is doubtful whether the veto player approach really improves our understanding of
the politics of welfare state reforms. In contrast, the veto point approach may be a better
starting point for investigating causes of reform success and reform failure, especially as it
does not over-determine the impact of institutions.
In the final chapter I conclude and discuss the usefulness of both approaches from a rather
normative point of view, i.e. from the capacity of the approaches to enrich and improve policy
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