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Veto Players and Welfare Reform: The Paradox of French and Japanese Unions
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Veto Players and Welfare Reform:
The Paradox of the French and Japanese Unions
Mari Miura
Bruno Palier
Sophia University
CEVIPOF-MSH
,
## email not listed ##
## email not listed ##
DRAFT: please do not quote without permission of the authors.
Summary
What makes unions veto players in the process of welfare reform? Although
organizationally weak, French and Japanese unions are able to block certain welfare reforms, thereby affecting negotiating patterns and policy outcomes. Comparing the veto power of French and Japanese unions, we argue that the way in which welfare programs are organized affects the veto power of unions more than the unions’ organizational strength, political institutions, state structure, or the political (ideological) orientation of the incumbent government. Our case studies also show that Japanese unions have more institutional veto power than their French counterparts, albeit in more limited policy domains. In contrast, the veto power of the French unions mainly derives from political resources.
Paper prepared for the annual meeting of the American Political Science AssociationPhiladelphia, August 27-31, 2003.
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| | Authors: Miura, Mari. and Palier, Bruno. |
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1
Veto Players and Welfare Reform:
The Paradox of the French and Japanese Unions
Mari Miura
Bruno Palier
Sophia University
CEVIPOF-MSH
,
## email not listed ##
## email not listed ##
DRAFT: please do not quote without permission of the authors.
Summary
What makes unions veto players in the process of welfare reform? Although
organizationally weak, French and Japanese unions are able to block certain welfare reforms,
thereby affecting negotiating patterns and policy outcomes. Comparing the veto power of
French and Japanese unions, we argue that the way in which welfare programs are organized
affects the veto power of unions more than the unions’ organizational strength, political
institutions, state structure, or the political (ideological) orientation of the incumbent
government. Our case studies also show that Japanese unions have more institutional veto
power than their French counterparts, albeit in more limited policy domains. In contrast, the
veto power of the French unions mainly derives from political resources.
Paper prepared for the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association
Philadelphia, August 27-31, 2003.
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