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Veto Players and Welfare Reform: The Paradox of French and Japanese Unions
Unformatted Document Text:  19 Under these procedural rules, there exist two veto points: the vote for recommendations and the vote for outlines of laws. Although they are both veto points, their structures differ, necessitating different strategies for veto power to be exerted. At the first veto point, discontented parties are able to vote against the advisory council’s recommendations. Under the majority rule of voting at the advisory council, a veto player is formally a median voter. A median voter always resides among public interest representatives because the Ministry of Labor’s advisory councils consist of tripartite representation. Labor delegates and employer delegates are usually in opposition, putting public interest representatives in the middle. Therefore, the veto power of the unions, or any other discontented party, cannot be effective at this point unless a median voter (that is, the public interest representatives) takes their side. Since public interest representatives do not veto their own propositions, no one can exercise veto power here. In theory, labor delegates and employer delegates, if allied, can veto proposals made by public interest representatives. Labor and employer delegates together cast two thirds of the vote. In a hypothetical, albeit unrealistic, situation, labor and employer delegates could draft the advisory council’s recommendations and propose them to the Ministry of Labor. However, the Ministry of Labor is not obligated to follow the recommendations of advisory councils. It is only required to consult with the advisory councils. Thus, the veto power of labor and employer delegates is not institutionalized at this stage. Obviously, it is highly unlikely that issues opposed by both unions and employers would appear on advisory council recommendations, as the Ministry of Labor usually coordinates legislation with reciprocal concessions between employers and unions. At the second veto point, the advisory councils cast votes on the outlines of government bills. At this stage, the presence of at least one delegate from the unions, employers, and public interest representatives is required by ministerial ordinance. If all of either the labor or

Authors: Miura, Mari. and Palier, Bruno.
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19
Under these procedural rules, there exist two veto points: the vote for recommendations
and the vote for outlines of laws. Although they are both veto points, their structures differ,
necessitating different strategies for veto power to be exerted.
At the first veto point, discontented parties are able to vote against the advisory council’s
recommendations. Under the majority rule of voting at the advisory council, a veto player is
formally a median voter. A median voter always resides among public interest representatives
because the Ministry of Labor’s advisory councils consist of tripartite representation. Labor
delegates and employer delegates are usually in opposition, putting public interest
representatives in the middle. Therefore, the veto power of the unions, or any other
discontented party, cannot be effective at this point unless a median voter (that is, the public
interest representatives) takes their side. Since public interest representatives do not veto their
own propositions, no one can exercise veto power here.
In theory, labor delegates and employer delegates, if allied, can veto proposals made by
public interest representatives. Labor and employer delegates together cast two thirds of the
vote. In a hypothetical, albeit unrealistic, situation, labor and employer delegates could draft
the advisory council’s recommendations and propose them to the Ministry of Labor.
However, the Ministry of Labor is not obligated to follow the recommendations of advisory
councils. It is only required to consult with the advisory councils. Thus, the veto power of
labor and employer delegates is not institutionalized at this stage. Obviously, it is highly
unlikely that issues opposed by both unions and employers would appear on advisory council
recommendations, as the Ministry of Labor usually coordinates legislation with reciprocal
concessions between employers and unions.
At the second veto point, the advisory councils cast votes on the outlines of government
bills. At this stage, the presence of at least one delegate from the unions, employers, and
public interest representatives is required by ministerial ordinance. If all of either the labor or


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