2
I.
Arguments
Since the mid-1970s, social protection systems in affluent democracies have been
confronted with new and comparable socio-economic challenges, such as mass and structural
unemployment, population ageing, rising female labor market participation, increasing capital
mobility, and intensified competition between economies. Paul Pierson has cogently
demonstrated that the politics of the welfare state in a period of such challenges and
consequent necessary adaptation (or even retrenchment) are different from its politics during
the “golden age” of welfare (Pierson, 1996). Moreover, the reforms implemented by
governments to respond to these challenges have varied between both countries and
governments. Different governments have responded in different ways and at different times
to similar and simultaneously occurring problems. The new politics of welfare reform differ
from country to country. In order to account for these differences, one must refer both to the
general political institutions in each country (Bonoli, 2001) and to the political orientation of
the incumbent government (Levy, 1999; Ross, 2000). One must also refer to the specific
features of national welfare state institutions. These latter shape the politics of reform,
defining the kinds of interests and resources that actors can mobilize either in favor of or
against welfare reforms. They also partly determine who can and who cannot participate in the
political game encompassing the reforms (Bonoli, Palier, 2000).
Focusing on the influence of welfare institutions, we pay particular attention to the role
of unions. In certain circumstances, unions play a crucial role in blocking, delaying, and
amending welfare reforms. In other words, when reforms are incremental and limited in
scope, unions or the social partners (employee and employer representatives) assume the role
of veto players (Tseleblis, 1995), that is to say, of actors whose consent is needed in order to
Convention