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pass a reform. The crucial role played by the social partners is conspicuous in the current
literature on welfare state reform (Esping-Andersen, (ed.), 1996; Ferrera, Rhodes, (eds.),
2000; Leibfried, (ed.), 2000; Scharpf, Schmidt, (eds.), 2000; Pierson, (ed.), 2001). The
Bismarckian welfare systems are said to be the slowest in reforming their social protection
systems, having made little progress with retrenchment measures. The participation of the
social partners in the process of reform (in their role as veto players) forces governments to
elaborate strategies of reform acceptable to the partners. During the 1990s, major reforms of
the Bismarckian welfare states were undertaken within the framework of “forced concerted
strategies” as governments were unable to act without taking into account union preferences,
and thus their reforms always contained quid pro quos in favor of the unions in order to
facilitate their passage. For instance, a review of pension reforms in Italy, France and
Germany shows that those that passed (The Rentenreform, Pension Reform Act of 1992; the
Balladur reform of 1993 and the Amato, 1992, and Dini, 1995, reforms in Italy) were
concerted efforts that had obtained the consent of at least some social partners. On the other
hand, reform projects that certain governments (Juppé in 1995, Berlusconi in 1995, Kohl in
1997) tried to impose without first obtaining a certain degree of social consensus failed to
gain passage because they provoked strong opposition, most notably from the trade unions.
One might argue that this dilemma is specific to pension reform, due to the complexity
and time frame of such reforms (Hinrichs, 2000). However, in 1986, Margaret Thatcher
managed to impose pension reform without negotiation. Our case study of the Japanese case
also exemplifies that unions can be ignored in pension reform. Rather, we would argue that
this pattern of politics (forced concerted strategies) is to be understood with regard to the
institutional configuration of the welfare states, as it can be identified not only in pension
reform, but also in other fields such as unemployment insurance, health insurance and labor
market regulation.
Convention