perhaps, the spike in Left party support for welfare spending in the late 1980s and early 1990s in
LMEs appears as a transitory phenomenon in Figure 2. In the last three windows, we observe a
very sharp decline in the association between Left government and social spending growth in
LMEs. Some trend in the same direction appears to have occurred in SMEs, but it is far less
dramatic.
[Figures 2 and 3 about here]
As far as the effects of government participation by Right parties are concerned, we again
observe very different dynamics in LMEs and SMEs. For LMEs, we observe significant
negative effects of Right party gains in cabinet representation in first five windows, but no
significant effects of change in government participation by Right parties thereafter. On a more
long-term basis, government participation by Right parties is positively associated with social
spending growth in four windows clustered in the middle of our time series (1966-80, 1969-83,
1972-86 and 1973-87), and negatively associated with social spending growth in four
consecutive, more recent windows (1978-92, 1979-93, 1980-94 and 1981-94). In the most recent
period covered by our analysis, governments dominated by Right parties appear to have been no
less prone to curtail social spending than other governments in LMEs. Again, the contrast with
SMEs is striking. In SMEs, government participation by Right parties was strongly associated
with more rapid social social spending growth in the 1970s, but Right parties appear to have
turned sharply against the welfare state in the 1980s. Most strikingly, our results show that Right
party gains in cabinet representation has steadily become more and more strongly associated with
slower social spending growth in SMEs.
9. Concluding discussion
The volatility of partisan effects makes it difficult to generalize about LMEs, but the
results presented in the preceding section clearly indicate that partisan conflict over welfare
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