What is so far missing from the literature, however, is an attempt to integrate these
literatures into a coherent framework for the analysis of transnational regulatory dynamics.
Leading scholars of intergovernmental cooperation show little interest in cooperation led by sub-
state regulatory agencies or non-state private actors. Analysts of alternative types of
cooperation, in turn, have been busy showing that these alternative forms exist and that they
matter. The obvious next step, begun by this study, is to ask what determines the form of
regulatory cooperation in an industry. In other words, this study asks when we are more likely to
see one type of regulatory cooperation rather than another.
There are important empirical and theoretical reasons to explore varieties of regulatory
cooperation in transnational markets for information goods. For one, by whom a market is
regulated profoundly shapes how it is substantively regulated. Cabinet-level trade authorities are
likely to have other interests than independent financial regulators. Public arbiters may have
different priorities for market regulation than firms actually participating in the market. Since
rules and regulations play important roles in determining who gets what, when, and how in
transnational markets, understanding who regulates these markets, why, and with what
motivation is critical. Furthermore, while the Internet has not simply rendered states impotent,
any careful assessment of the evolving relationship of “the state” and new transnational markets
in an age of “globalization” should appreciate the institutional complexity of this relationship.
Finally, from a purely theoretical standpoint, asking what accounts for variation in forms of
regulatory cooperation provides an ideal platform from which to contribute to broader questions
about institutional origin, design, and development, questions that have preoccupied scholars in
recent years (e.g., Knight and Sened 1998; Pierson 2000; Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal 2001a).
4
Convention