Author's Keywords: WTO, international institutions, trade negotiations	Convention All Academic Convention makes running your annual conference simple and cost effective. It is your online solution for abstract management, peer review, and scheduling for your annual meeting or convention. Submission - Custom fields, multiple submission types, tracks, audio visual, multiple upload formats, automatic conversion to pdf. Review - Peer Review, Bulk reviewer assignment, bulk emails, ranking, z-score statistics, and multiple worksheets! Reports - Many standard and custom reports generated while you wait. Print programs with participant indexes, event grids, and more! Scheduling - Flexible and convenient grid scheduling within rooms and buildings. Conflict checking and advanced filtering. Communication - Bulk email tools to help your administrators send reminders and responses. Use form letters, a message center, and much more! Management - Search tools, duplicate people management, editing tools, submission transfers, many tools to manage a variety of conference management headaches! Click here for more information.
Association: Name: American Political Science Association URL: http://www.apsanet.org
Citation: URL: http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p64352_index.html Direct Link: HTML Code:

Davis, Christina. "Setting the Negotiation Table: The Choice of Institutions for Trade Disputes" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Philadelphia Marriott Hotel, Philadelphia, PA, Aug 27, 2003 <Not Available>. 2009-05-26 <http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p64352_index.html>

Davis, C. , 2003-08-27 "Setting the Negotiation Table: The Choice of Institutions for Trade Disputes" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Philadelphia Marriott Hotel, Philadelphia, PA Online <.PDF>. 2009-05-26 from http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p64352_index.html

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript Review Method: Peer Reviewed Abstract: International Relations theory has focused on the evolution of international institutions and their impact on state behavior. Less understood is the dynamic behind state choices to use an institution. In this paper, I examine how interest groups influence the decision to negotiate trade problems at the bilateral level, as part of an adjudication process, or as an issue in a comprehensive trade round. The different venues available for trade negotiations vary in terms of the issues, rules, and actors. Drawing on several empirical cases, I present a framework to understand the choice of negotiation forum. Interest groups on both sides have preferences for the flexibility, scope, and timing of liberalization, and governments choose the forum that allows them to address interest group concerns as well as diplomatic goals. I argue that the choice of negotiation forum depends upon the relative balance between interest group pressure in the two countries. I conclude that this dynamic pushes the most difficult trade issues into WTO dispute adjudication or trade rounds, while easier trade problems are dealt with in bilateral or regional negotiations.

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