3
activists and local politicians reacted by challenging the legal foundation and political
rationale of the American military presence, especially as it was outlined in the U.S.-
Japan Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA). Street protests became frequent and
increasingly large, and on October 21, 85,000 demonstrators took to the streets in the
largest protest action in the island’s history.
3
Peace activists from non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) based on the island presented their grievances at international
venues ranging from United Nations conferences to U.S. congressional hearings; they
also networked with advocacy groups from other countries that hosted U.S. facilities,
including both South Korea and the U.S. itself.
4
International newspapers and other
worldwide media picked up the story and followed its aftermath. Emboldened by the
international spotlight and the groundswell of support following the 1995 incident, the
governor of Okinawa prefecture, Masahide Ota, launched an all-out political campaign
against the U.S. base presence, arguing that the U.S. should leave Okinawa by 2015. He
organized Japan’s first ever prefecture-wide popular referendum for Fall 1996,
addressing the question of whether the U.S. military presence on the island should be
reduced.
In response to this anti-base activism, both the government of Japan and U.S. authorities
undertook a variety of measures to try to stem what they perceived as a rising tide of anti-
base sentiment. On the suggestion of U.S. Defense Secretary William Perry a new
Authors’ interview with a senior representative of U.S. Forces Japan, Okinawa, May 2003.
3
Mike Millard, “Okinawa, Then and Now,” in Johnson, ed., Okinawa: Cold War Island, pp. 96-7.
4
Authors’ interview with an Okinawan prefecture assembly member who is also an NGO activist, Okinawa,
May 2003.
Convention