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symbols, images and grievances that local actors can periodically tap in order to extract
rents, compensation payments and material concessions from the central government in
Tokyo. By invoking certain arguments or long-standing scripts concerning the “special
burden” that Okinawa carries on the basing issue, Okinawan political actors can leverage
incidents involving crimes, accidents and mishaps associated with the American military
bases into self-interested material gain.
We start by reviewing the prevailing constructivist approaches, explaining why we
believe these arguments are insufficient for understanding the politics of the Okinawa
issue. We offer an alternative account of how norms of antimilitarism can be overcome
and used instrumentally by self-interested actors. We then provide an overview of the
various trilateral bargaining arrangements that support the United States basing presence
in Okinawa, and identify the actors who are enmeshed in the political economy of these
“base bargains.” We go on to illustrate these arguments by examining a variety of
episodes in recent Okinawan politics that are better explained by our political economy
approach than by constructivist arguments, concentrating on the political construction of
base-related “incidents” and the politics of base reversion under the SACO agreement. In
our conclusion, we highlight both the theoretical and policy significance of our
arguments.
Constructivism and Okinawa’s Antimilitarism Norm
Constructivist arguments in international relations seek to link the identities and social
situations of states and societies to observed behavioral outcomes that are otherwise
Convention