8
case, it is likely that each antagonist is making a claim to a bill that denies the right of the other side to
possess the dollar; given that the bill is irreplaceable, it is difficult to see how any mechanism of division
would be acceptable to the actors. The bargaining positions of the actors, therefore, effectively eliminate
space for compromise, constituting the dollar bill as indivisible.
Defining indivisibility as a constructed rather than an intrinsic property of an issue is useful in at
least three respects. First, the definition accepts the premise that all issues may be divisible in theory,
while at the same time admitting that actors may not be able to accept a compromise in practice. Second,
by conceiving of indivisibility as a characteristic of the bargaining positions, we also allow for an issue to
vary in its divisibility over time: issues can change from being divisible to indivisible depending upon
actor’s how actors represent the issue during negotiations.
Finally, the definition given here distinguishes indivisibility from other dynamics within the
bargaining process. As mentioned above, some theorists have argued that indivisibility is a by-product of
other processes: they assume that a compromise is available to the actors—that the bargaining range is
continuous—and that it is really mechanisms like commitment problems or precedent-setting issues that
lead to issues appearing as if they are indivisible. But saying that actors did not reach a settlement is
different than saying that there was no possible division of the issue available, which is what the
definition here implies. It is not that actors could have divided the issue had it not been for other
mechanisms unrelated to the issue; it is that given the incommensurable definitions of the issue, there
simply is no division that exists.
This last benefit brings us to another important point, namely that in defining indivisibility it is
also important to clarify what indivisibility does not mean. It has already been argued that indivisibility is
not a physical phenomenon: divisibility should not be reduced to “ability to partition”, as there are several
other mechanisms by which issues can be divided. But it is also critical not to conflate indivisibility with
any particular outcome of bargaining. Most notably, indivisibility is not bargaining failure. Clearly,
bargaining failure is one possible outcome that could be associated with indivisibility. But other
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Binmore 1992, 191.
Convention