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LOST IN TRANSLATION: Theories of Military Victory and Strategic Coercion
in the Korean War and Taiwan Strait
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| | Unformatted Document Text:
Please cite only with permission
Twomey: Lost in Translation, APSA
8/27/03
Page 27
Finally, Mao had downplayed the likelihood of the U.S. getting involved in the Korean
War. The two leading Chinese scholars writing on this period from the US, as well as other
authors, agree on this point.
102
It is easy to understand why this would be the case given the
perspective on American strategy outlined above. Since Mao thought U.S.’s intervention would
be costly to the Americans, and because he thought the U.S. cared about such costs, he
downplayed the likelihood of the U.S. getting involved. Part of this view came from a general
view that communist leaders believed that contradictions among the capitalist forces would be
unlikely to lead them to unify in opposition to any communist gains.
103
This view remained
dominant in December of 1949 with both Mao and Stalin, as Mao noted in summarizing the two
leader’s shared views on the general situation in Asia:
Stalin said that the Americans are afraid to fight a war. Americans order others to fight, but theytoo are afraid. According to this thinking, it would be very hard for war to arise. We agree withthis estimate.
104
Merely a month later, senior military leaders in China were downplaying the possibility of the
United States sending troops to defend Taiwan in the event of a PRC invasion there.
105
Each of
these factors suggests that at a general level, the Chinese were inclined to downplay the
likelihood of American intervention.
102
Chen, China's Road, 126. See also pp. 134-5; Shu Guang Zhang, "Command, Control, and the PLA's Offensive
Campaigns in Korea, 1950-51," in Chinese Warfighting: The PLA Experience since 1949, ed. Mark A. Ryan,David M. Finkelstein, and Michael A. McDevitt (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 2003), 91. Odd ArneWestad, Decisive Encounters: The Chinese Civil War, 1946-1950 (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press,2003), 321. Xiaoming Zhang, Red Wings over the Yalu: China, the Soviet Union, and the Air War in Korea, 1sted. (College Station, Tex.: Texas A&M University Press, 2002), 56-57. Shen suggests that there were concernsthat Japan might enter, but not the United States. Zhihua Shen, "China Sends Troops to Korea: Beijing's Policy-Making Process," in China and the United States: A New Cold War History, ed. Xiaobing Li and Hongshan Li(Lanham: University Press of America, 1998), 15.
103
Stueck, The Korean War, 79. For a study describing the centrality of communist ideology in Mao’s approach to
international affairs, see Michael M. Sheng, Battling Western Imperialism: Mao, Stalin, and the United States(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997).
104
Italics added. Translated from Jianzhang Pei, Foreign Relations History of the People’s Republic of China:
1949-56, (in Chinese) (Beijing: World Knowledge Press, 1994). For a comparison of this source to two otherson the same meeting, see Jian Chen, "Commentaries: Comparing Russian and Chinese Sources: A New Point ofDeparture for Cold War History," Bulletin of the Cold War International History Project, no. 6-7 (1995/96): 20.
105
Chen, China's Road, 102.
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| | Authors: Twomey, Christopher. |
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Please cite only with permission
Twomey: Lost in Translation, APSA
8/27/03
Page 27
Finally, Mao had downplayed the likelihood of the U.S. getting involved in the Korean
War. The two leading Chinese scholars writing on this period from the US, as well as other
authors, agree on this point.
102
It is easy to understand why this would be the case given the
perspective on American strategy outlined above. Since Mao thought U.S.’s intervention would
be costly to the Americans, and because he thought the U.S. cared about such costs, he
downplayed the likelihood of the U.S. getting involved. Part of this view came from a general
view that communist leaders believed that contradictions among the capitalist forces would be
unlikely to lead them to unify in opposition to any communist gains.
103
This view remained
dominant in December of 1949 with both Mao and Stalin, as Mao noted in summarizing the two
leader’s shared views on the general situation in Asia:
Stalin said that the Americans are afraid to fight a war. Americans order others to fight, but they
too are afraid. According to this thinking, it would be very hard for war to arise. We agree with
this estimate.
104
Merely a month later, senior military leaders in China were downplaying the possibility of the
United States sending troops to defend Taiwan in the event of a PRC invasion there.
105
Each of
these factors suggests that at a general level, the Chinese were inclined to downplay the
likelihood of American intervention.
102
Chen, China's Road, 126. See also pp. 134-5; Shu Guang Zhang, "Command, Control, and the PLA's Offensive
Campaigns in Korea, 1950-51," in Chinese Warfighting: The PLA Experience since 1949, ed. Mark A. Ryan,
David M. Finkelstein, and Michael A. McDevitt (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 2003), 91. Odd Arne
Westad, Decisive Encounters: The Chinese Civil War, 1946-1950 (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press,
2003), 321. Xiaoming Zhang, Red Wings over the Yalu: China, the Soviet Union, and the Air War in Korea, 1st
ed. (College Station, Tex.: Texas A&M University Press, 2002), 56-57. Shen suggests that there were concerns
that Japan might enter, but not the United States. Zhihua Shen, "China Sends Troops to Korea: Beijing's Policy-
Making Process," in China and the United States: A New Cold War History, ed. Xiaobing Li and Hongshan Li
(Lanham: University Press of America, 1998), 15.
103
Stueck, The Korean War, 79. For a study describing the centrality of communist ideology in Mao’s approach to
international affairs, see Michael M. Sheng, Battling Western Imperialism: Mao, Stalin, and the United States
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997).
104
Italics added. Translated from Jianzhang Pei, Foreign Relations History of the People’s Republic of China:
1949-56, (in Chinese) (Beijing: World Knowledge Press, 1994). For a comparison of this source to two others
on the same meeting, see Jian Chen, "Commentaries: Comparing Russian and Chinese Sources: A New Point of
Departure for Cold War History," Bulletin of the Cold War International History Project, no. 6-7 (1995/96): 20.
105
Chen, China's Road, 102.
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