Please cite only with permission
Twomey: Lost in Translation, APSA
8/27/03
Page 37
Thus, a mere two days after the outbreak of the Korean War, the US signaled its intent to defend
Taiwan against a Chinese offensive. In the more than 50 years since, there has been no invasion.
This case asks to what extent did the two sides views of effective naval doctrine shape the
outcome in this case of deterrence success.
The Two Sides’ Doctrinal Beliefs about Effective Naval Strategy
While the previous two cases centered on warfare in the Korean Peninsula (and
potentially in China proper), this case demands consideration of a different military environment.
For the Taiwan Straits theater, the relevant military forces are obviously naval and air forces.
One set of naval forces and doctrines was indeed quite different across the two nations. The two
sides’ views of the sea control mission—competing for control of sea lines of
communication—were far apart.
However, for the purposes of this case, the key comparison is in doctrine regarding
amphibious operations. The coercive attempt here is one of deterring a Chinese amphibious
invasion of Taiwan. Thus, the question is, did the Chinese have difficulty understanding the
threat posed to their invasion plans by the American threats due to differences in the two nation’s
amphibious operations doctrine. In particular, would the Chinese be likely to underestimate the
threat posed by the American 7
th
fleet?
On the issue of amphibious operations, there would have been a surprising degree of
shared understanding between Beijing and Washington. The Chinese had recently learned quite
a bit in this area against a relatively advanced foe. Their attempts to conquer the small coastal
islands of Jinmen, Zhoushan, and Dengbu in late 1949 had led to abysmal defeats. Mao’s
assessment of the first of these was stark: “This is our biggest loss of the war.”
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Westad, Decisive Encounters: The Chinese Civil War, 1946-1950, 301.
Convention