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Twomey: Lost in Translation, APSA
8/27/03
Page 2
Sino-American relations provide an excellent window into the phenomenon of
misperception, miscommunication, and false optimism caused by differences in theories of
military victory. In the early 1950s, Beijing ignored American threats, implicit or explicit, of
nuclear attack. Mao’s widely reported public views of nuclear weapons as “paper tigers” were
mirrored by private comments of similar substance. Similarly, Chinese threats of intervention
using a strategy of “people’s war” did not create any trepidation in Washington (MacArthur’s
reaction was closer to derision). Both sides viewed the other’s key military strategy with
disdain. Not only did this lead to difficulties in assessing the overall balance of power between
the two, but it also made sending signals between them very difficult. As two cases will show,
this contributed to outbreak and escalation of the Korean War in significant ways.
The paper proceeds as follows. It begins with a discussion of the topic at a broad level.
Then it lays out specific hypotheses with associated definitions. Next, it turns to empirical work,
examining two cases of escalations in the Korean War and a case of stability in the Taiwan Strait
before concluding with a discussion of the implications of the research.
Existing Literature
Political science has long emphasized the difficulties in assessing an adversary’s intent;
less studied but equally important for the conduct of international diplomacy is assessing an
adversary’s capabilities. States choose policies toward other states based on the relative balance
between them.
4
Further, states often use military forces to signal their interests and capabilities.
However, measuring power is recognized to be very difficult.
5
There is no simple index that we
4
For instance, on the role of power in the choice between balancing versus balancing, see Stephen M. Walt, The
Origins of Alliances (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987).
5
William Curti Wohlforth, The Elusive Balance: Power and Perceptions During the Cold War (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 1993). John Prados, The Soviet Estimate: U.S. Intelligence Analysis & Soviet Strategic Forces
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1986). This is also implicitly supported in Kirshner, "Rationalist
Explanations for War?," 147-150.
Convention