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LOST IN TRANSLATION: Theories of Military Victory and Strategic Coercion in the Korean War and Taiwan Strait
Unformatted Document Text:  Please cite only with permission Twomey: Lost in Translation, APSA 8/27/03 Page 45 military victory. In a third case, more similar theories of victory permitted the straight-forward communication of intent and capabilities between the two nations. While each of the three cases supported the paper’s theory, alternate explanations focusing on the clarity and strength of the signals received only mixed support. Figure 2 - Summary of Cases Hypothesis/ Variable Case Outcome IV: Difference in Theory of Military Victory H 1 : Diff Theory of Mil. Victory -> Underest. H 2 : Underest. -> Coercive Failure Chinese Approvalof NK Invasion Deterrence Failure Large Strongly Supported Partially Supported (poor evidence) US Crossing 38thParallel Deterrence Failure Large Strongly Supported Strongly Supported Taiwan Strait,1950 Deterrence Success Small Strongly Supported Partially Supported (poor evidence) This project provides an analytic lens for studying military capability. It has important policy implications for the conduct of international diplomacy and statecraft, particularly in the context of the ongoing RMA. For instance, the U.S. military is increasingly reliant on airpower and an emphasis on ‘total battlespace awareness’ in its theory of military victory. Washington should not expect its adversaries to fully appreciate these capabilities. When the U.S. sends deterrent or compellent signals relying on the threat or actual use of this military power, it should avoid assuming that its adversaries will view American forces as Washington does. This paper calls attention to considering the perceptual lens of the adversary a nation is trying to influence. For effective international communication, both sides must understand the language of diplomacy. When that language depends on military threats, different theories of victory can lead to problems in translation and thus unnecessary conflict. To avoid this costly outcome, states should tailor their signals to the perceptual framework of their adversaries with regard to military doctrine and effectiveness, that is, to their theory of military victory.

Authors: Twomey, Christopher.
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Please cite only with permission
Twomey: Lost in Translation, APSA
8/27/03
Page 45
military victory. In a third case, more similar theories of victory permitted the straight-forward
communication of intent and capabilities between the two nations. While each of the three cases
supported the paper’s theory, alternate explanations focusing on the clarity and strength of the
signals received only mixed support.
Figure 2 - Summary of Cases
Hypothesis/
Variable
Case
Outcome
IV: Difference in
Theory of Military
Victory
H
1
: Diff Theory of
Mil. Victory ->
Underest.
H
2
: Underest. ->
Coercive Failure
Chinese Approval
of NK Invasion
Deterrence Failure
Large
Strongly Supported
Partially Supported
(poor evidence)
US Crossing 38th
Parallel
Deterrence Failure
Large
Strongly Supported
Strongly Supported
Taiwan Strait,
1950
Deterrence Success
Small
Strongly Supported
Partially Supported
(poor evidence)
This project provides an analytic lens for studying military capability. It has important
policy implications for the conduct of international diplomacy and statecraft, particularly in the
context of the ongoing RMA. For instance, the U.S. military is increasingly reliant on airpower
and an emphasis on ‘total battlespace awareness’ in its theory of military victory. Washington
should not expect its adversaries to fully appreciate these capabilities. When the U.S. sends
deterrent or compellent signals relying on the threat or actual use of this military power, it should
avoid assuming that its adversaries will view American forces as Washington does.
This paper calls attention to considering the perceptual lens of the adversary a nation is
trying to influence. For effective international communication, both sides must understand the
language of diplomacy. When that language depends on military threats, different theories of
victory can lead to problems in translation and thus unnecessary conflict. To avoid this costly
outcome, states should tailor their signals to the perceptual framework of their adversaries with
regard to military doctrine and effectiveness, that is, to their theory of military victory.


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