Burbach, “Rally ‘Round the Flag, or Run Away!”
Page 4
In recent years, though, likely opponents of the United States have outlined a
theory of victory which is a variant of the pain strategy: that inflicting relatively minor
casualties upon U.S. forces will cause the casualty-phobic American people to place such
political pressure
3
on the President that the U.S. will be forced to withdraw from
conflicts,
4
even the leadership itself would want to stay in the conflict. This view that the
American public would tolerate only brief, low casualty conflicts emerged after the
American withdrawal from Vietnam, gained currency after U.S. withdrawal from
Lebanon after the bombings there, and has become especially prominent following the
American abandonment of Somalia in the wake of losses there in 1993.
5
Some attribute
this aversion to the disillusioning affects of Vietnam, some to post-Cold War isolationist
3
Pain-inflicting strategies in general do not have to rely on public opinion as the source of the decision to
abandon the fight. For example, military leaders might balk at the cost of replacing the men and materiel
lost, or political leaders may demand that a given fight be finished rapidly so forces will be available for
future purposes.
4
A few authors argue that public opposition should have the opposite effect. Schwartz claims that the U.S.
public demands “escalation to victory” in response to costly, unsuccessful conflicts. Benjamin Schwartz,
Casualties, Public Opinion, and U.S. Military Strategy (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1994). Downs and
Rocke acknowledge that wars may be unpopular but suggest leaders may “gamble for resurrection” by
escalating, hoping for better battlefield outcomes and if not, faring no worse (electoral defeat) than if they
had withdrawn. George W. Downs and David M. Rocke, "Conflict, Agency, and Gambling for
Resurrection", American Journal of Political Science, vol. 28, no. 2 (1994), pp 362-280; their work
spawned a substantial literature, see Graeme Davies, "Domestic Strife and the Initiation of International
Conflicts, 1950-1982", Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 46, no. 5 (2002), pp 672-692. Downs and
Rocke’s thesis does raise the question of whether electoral defeat is the only sanction available, as they
assume, or whether short-term costs might rule out the resurrection strategy (e.g, Congressional action, loss
of influence on other policy issues, or protests making the country “ungovernable”), which is an implied
belief of many who accept the public outcry hypothesis.
5
Commentators arguing that such public opinion constraints do exist include Edward Luttwak, "A Post-
Heroic Military Policy", Foreign Affairs, vol. (1996); Arthur Schlessinger, "Back to the Womb?
Isolationism's Renewed Threat", Foreign Affairs, vol. (1995); Samuel Huntington, "Playing to Win",
National Interest, vol. (1986); John Gentry, "Military Force in an Age of National Cowardice",
Washington Quarterly, vol. (1998); Harvey M. Sapolsky and Jeremy Shapiro, "Casualties, Technology,
and Americas Future Wars", Parameters, vol. (1996). Such concerns also underly the “Powell Doctrine”
of fighting only rapid, decisive battles where a quick U.S. victory is assured; for discussions of this doctrine
see Kenneth Cambell, "Once Burned, Twice Cautious: Explaining the Weinberger-Powell Doctrine",
Armed Force & Society, vol. (1998), pp 357-374; Andrew P. N. Erdmann, "The U.S. Presumption of
Quick, Costless Wars", Orbis, vol. (1999), pp 363-381; Max Boot, The Savage Wars of Peace (New York:
Basic Books, 2002).. Many other observers disagree that public support will always be weak; see
discussion in note 25, below.
Convention