Burbach, “Rally ‘Round the Flag, or Run Away!”
Page 9
that the public was too easily convinced to back wars.
24
Regarding the recent claims of a
weak-willed public, many scholars and commentators argue that public opinion data
simply does not support this. Instead they argue that public support is context dependent,
with the U.S. public is quite ready to accept costs to defend clear strategic interests, even
if not on behalf of humanitarian intervention.
25
Others disagree that public opinion
reacted so negatively even in Somalia, Lebanon, and other supposedly archetypical cases
of public backlash.
26
The controversy has important implications for U.S. foreign policy, and so a
better understanding of it is essential. Fundamentally this is an empirical debate: how
has the American public reacted in the past, and what can we expect in the future? This
study contributes to that debate by testing several hypotheses implied by the public
outcry theory against the record of Presidential support and uses of force. First, however,
the public outcry theory is stated in terms of rational deterrence models, to better identify
the effects that public opinion – and misperceptions of it – will have on crisis outcomes.
Deterring the U.S.: The “Public Veto” Theory
24
See for example Theodore Lowi, "Ronald Reagan -- Revolutionary?", in The Reagan Presidency and the
Governing of America, Lester Saloman and Michael Lund, (Washington: Urban Institute, 1985), p. 54
25
John Mueller, "Public Support for Military Ventures Abroad: Evidence from the Polls", in The Real
Lessons of the Vietnam War, John Norton Moore and Robert Turner, (Durham, N.C.: Carolina Academic
Press, 2002) provides the most comprehensive analysis of support for different interventions; he argues that
public’s staying power is much higher than the critics claim, and that Americans are willing to bear high
costs for conflicts with high stakes. See also Boot, Richard K. Betts, "What Will It Take to Deter the
United States?", Parameters, vol. (1995-1996), Erdmann, "The U.S. Presumption of Quick, Costless
Wars", Eric Larson, Casualties and Consensus: The Historical Role of Casualties in Support For U.S.
Military Operations (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1996);
Peter D. Feaver and Christopher
Gelpi, “How Many Deaths Are Acceptable? A Surprising Answer,” The Washington Post, 7 November
1999; Charles Krauthammer, “America, Battle-Tested,” The Washington Post, 18 January 2002; John E.
Mueller, War, Presidents, and Public Opinion (New York: Wiley, 1973)
26
James Burk, "Public Support for Peacekeeping in Lebanon and Somalia: Assessing the Causalities
Hypothesis", Political Science Quarterly, vol. 114 (1999), pp 53-78
Convention