fears of an expanding norm have grown with international criticisms of its own civil
war in Chechnya.
31
For the Russians, it is both consistent and easier to argue the
merits of noninterference when it supports the principle in the Security Council.
Similarly, Chinese fears about its own minorities, notably Tibetans, cause it to act
in support of the principle of nonintervention.
32
For these states, a new norm that would allow or perhaps even encourage for-
eign intervention in civil conflicts is unwanted. It is likely then that these states will
act to help preserve the nonintervention norm, and placing importance on peace
treaties does just that. As explained earlier, peace treaties contain a political set-
tlement. Intervention where a political settlement exists does less to damage the
non-intervention norm than intervention where only a cease-fire exists because at
some point after the cease-fire, those intervening help to determine the ultimate po-
litical settlement. To those concerned about the non-intervention norm, mitigating
that possibility is useful.
What evidence can we gather to test this argument? One way is to examine the
correlation of UN interventions with treaties during different periods of the UN’s
history. When permanent Security Council members are less concerned about their
own rebellious populations and thus less concerned with international pressures to
address their internal situations, then they should care less about the treaty norm.
Conversely, when Security Council permanent members are more concerned with the
norm, they should care more about intervening where treaties exist. This situation
likely exists today since the Chechnyan civil began in Russia. The war has gone
badly for Russia and calls for international mediation and what it consider meddling
in its domestic affairs, have increased Russia’s concerns with the sovereignty norm.
33
Examining this relationship between UN interventions and treaties, we find the
expected relationship. During the Cold war, before 1989, the correlation between
treaty and intervention was low, 0.23. After the Cold War and after the breakup of
the Soviet Union the correlation rose: since 1989 it has been 0.41. Most importantly,
when sovereignty considerations were most likely to develop in Russia, since the
Chechyan war, the correlation has gone up to 0.52, and after 1999, the correlation has
31
The Economist
, March 18, 2000.
32
See The Economist March 18, 2000.
33
There has been less variation in the other permanent Security Council members’ attitudes
towards secessionist movements. China has been plagued with separatist threats throughout its
existence and the United Kingdom’s concerns with Northern Ireland have not generated sizable fears
of foreign involvement in its conflict. Finally, the US and France have not had sizable separatists
concerns. This ignores the Algerian war for independence, but in 1960’s the UN was seldom active
for different reasons.
16
Convention