Author's Keywords: territorial dispute, domestic audience, nationalism	Convention All Academic Convention can solve the abstract management needs for any association's annual meeting. Submission - Custom fields, multiple submission types, tracks, audio visual, multiple upload formats, automatic conversion to pdf. Review - Peer Review, Bulk reviewer assignment, bulk emails, ranking, z-score statistics, and multiple worksheets! Reports - Many standard and custom reports generated while you wait. Print programs with participant indexes, event grids, and more! Scheduling - Flexible and convenient grid scheduling within rooms and buildings. Conflict checking and advanced filtering. Communication - Bulk email tools to help your administrators send reminders and responses. Use form letters, a message center, and much more! Management - Search tools, duplicate people management, editing tools, submission transfers, many tools to manage a variety of conference management headaches! Click here for more information.
Association: Name: American Political Science Association URL: http://www.apsanet.org
Citation: URL: http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p64454_index.html Direct Link: HTML Code:

Wiegand, Krista. "�This Land is Our Land:� The Domestic Incentives of Delaying Settlement of Nationalist Territorial Disputes" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Philadelphia Marriott Hotel, Philadelphia, PA, Aug 27, 2003 <Not Available>. 2009-05-26 <http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p64454_index.html>

Wiegand, K. , 2003-08-27 "�This Land is Our Land:� The Domestic Incentives of Delaying Settlement of Nationalist Territorial Disputes" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Philadelphia Marriott Hotel, Philadelphia, PA Online <.PDF>. 2009-05-26 from http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p64454_index.html

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript Review Method: Peer Reviewed Abstract: Some disputes over territory with nationalist value are difficult to settle, while others are negotiated peacefully or the claim is dropped altogether. This paper proposes that rational decision makers select a dispute strategy that provides the highest payoff in the form of mobilized domestic support. The general hypothesis is that decision makers that are vulnerable in terms of popular support and sustainability of leadership are more likely to delay attempts to settle a dispute over territory with nationalist value since mobilized domestic support is achieved by persevering in the dispute. By using nationalist rhetoric to stir up domestic support for themselves in light of a territorial dispute, decision makers are placed in a situation in which they risk losing popularity and/or actual political power if they attempt to settle a dispute over territory claimed to be inherent to the national homeland. This theory attempts to explain why decision makers often make fewer attempts to settle disputes over territory with nationalist value.

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