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The rhetoric used in territorial disputes is therefore costly since the only way to prevent
domestic punishment is for vulnerable decision makers to bind themselves by actually pursuing
actions claimed in the rhetoric. In the case of nationalist territorial disputes, this means the
decision maker must persevere and prevent conceding, which would contradict the rhetoric in
which the selectorate has bought. If the vulnerable decision maker does in fact decide to concede
when the selectorate has been convinced of the salience of the disputed territory with nationalist
value, the rhetoric becomes directly costly in that decision makers will likely be punished
domestically. Giving up the claim or defense of territory framed as indivisible would be risky
since support by the selectorate may falter and decision makers might lose support or even
power. In post-war Japan for example, “a leader who was personally indifferent to the return of
the [Kurile] islands [from the Soviet Union/Russia] would have a strong electoral incentive to
pursue the claim if he or she valued high office, and would pay a high electoral price by
abandoning it” (Kimura and Welch 1998, 238).
Thus, if decision makers care about public opinion, reputation, saving face, honor,
credibility, and particularly remaining in tenure, they will select a strategy that prevents domestic
punishment. In order to prevent potential domestic punishment, vulnerable decision makers must
select a territorial dispute strategy that best satisfies the selectorate, regardless of whether in a
democratic or authoritarian regime. The argument presented here suggests that the most effective
strategy to accomplish the objective of preventing domestic punishment is to persevere in the
dispute and not negotiate any major concessions in dispute negotiations with the opponent.
Convention