2
Since 1950, there have been 69 disputes over territory with nationalist value and without
material or strategic value. Of these disputes, 26 percent have been settled through peaceful
negotiations, 25 percent have ended because the challenger state dropped the territorial claim,
one ended forcefully, and 9 percent ended with the defending state withdrawing from the
disputed territory. The remaining 42 percent of these disputes are still ongoing, many of which
have lasted for decades. Why are some disputes over territory with nationalist value difficult to
settle while others are negotiated peacefully or the claim is dropped altogether? The research
presented here attempts to examine the factors influencing the strategic choice of whether to
attempt settlement or whether to persevere in a dispute over territory with nationalist value.
This paper is part of a larger thesis that proposes that rational decision makers select a
dispute strategy that provides the highest payoff in the form of both territorial and non-territorial
gains, which differ in each dispute dyad. The general idea is that states and decision makers can
benefit from the non-territorial gains by engaging in territorial disputes regardless of who
actually wins the territory or if the dispute is ever settled.
1
This paper focuses specifically on the
role of 1) nationalist value of territory, and 2) the non-territorial gain of mobilized domestic
support.
2
I suggest here that the non-territorial gain of mobilized domestic support will influence
certain decision makers to persevere in the dispute and not attempt to settle. Analyzing the
conditions that make decision makers more likely to persevere in a dispute rather than attempt to
settle should help explain the variation in territorial dispute strategies and outcomes.
1
The thesis focuses on all disputes over territory without strategic value from 1950-2002, which includes disputed
territory with material value, nationalist value, both material and nationalist values, and neither type of value.
2
Another non-territorial gain not discussed in this particular paper but in the larger thesis is reputation for
bargaining resolve. See Krista E. Wiegand, “The Role of Crises in Territorial Dispute Bargaining,” presented at the
American Political Science Association, Women in International Security Panel I, Philadelphia, PA, August 2003.
Convention