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One of the central findings in this paper is that economic and military coercion are more closely
related that one would expect from looking at the rest of the literature. While there are certainly empirical
differences in what factors influence the target’s compliance decision, the basic logic by which coercion
leads to compliance and the logic by which various factors affect this is quite consistent.
This points to a second important finding, which is that by focusing on the mechanism of
coercion we can gain insights into what determines compliance that will not necessarily be apparent when
the focus is on the tool of coercion. While the tools of coercion can be used for other purposes, the same
mechanism of coercion can be triggered with a variety of tools. If we want to understand coercion
compliance, the focus needs to be on the mechanism.
This paper also indicates that the Political Accountability model of coercion compliance, which is
based on employment of the support erosion mechanism of coercion, is the best model of coercion
compliance currently available. The Political Accountability model is particularly good at explaining
compliance with economic coercion, and after further research may also offer substantial insight into
compliance with military coercion. This a far better record than models of compliance based on the
denial, destabilization, and weakening models achieve in this test.
Finally, the results in this paper point to some interesting directions for future research into the
nature of coercion in general and the relationship between economic and military coercion in particular.
What is the nature of any theoretical differences in how military and economic coercion work, and what
implication does that have for compliance? What impact do the empirical differences between economic
and military coercion have upon the theory and practice of how they operate? Finally, why are there these
empirical differences in the employment of economic and military coercion?
In conclusion, this paper demonstrates the value of taking a different approach to studying
coercion outcomes. Without putting the focus on the mechanism by which coercive pressure translates
into policy decisions by the target, and comparing the same models to sets of both economic and military
coercion, it would not be possible to gain the insights or raise the questions which follow from this
research.
Convention