Author's Keywords: Bargaining model of war Game Theory Termination of War	Convention All Academic Convention makes running your annual conference simple and cost effective. It is your online solution for abstract management, peer review, and scheduling for your annual meeting or convention. Submission - Custom fields, multiple submission types, tracks, audio visual, multiple upload formats, automatic conversion to pdf. Review - Peer Review, Bulk reviewer assignment, bulk emails, ranking, z-score statistics, and multiple worksheets! Reports - Many standard and custom reports generated while you wait. Print programs with participant indexes, event grids, and more! Scheduling - Flexible and convenient grid scheduling within rooms and buildings. Conflict checking and advanced filtering. Communication - Bulk email tools to help your administrators send reminders and responses. Use form letters, a message center, and much more! Management - Search tools, duplicate people management, editing tools, submission transfers, many tools to manage a variety of conference management headaches! Click here for more information.
Association: Name: American Political Science Association URL: http://www.apsanet.org
Citation: URL: http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p64478_index.html Direct Link: HTML Code:

Werner, Suzanne. "Fighting to Win: Translating Military Gains into Political Victories" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Philadelphia Marriott Hotel, Philadelphia, PA, Aug 27, 2003 <Not Available>. 2009-05-26 <http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p64478_index.html>

Werner, S. , 2003-08-27 "Fighting to Win: Translating Military Gains into Political Victories" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Philadelphia Marriott Hotel, Philadelphia, PA Online <.PDF>. 2009-05-26 from http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p64478_index.html

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript Review Method: Peer Reviewed Abstract: In Filson and Werner (2002), we introduced a formal model of bargaining and war to explore conditions under which states that can negotiate settlements choose to initiate and terminate violence. In Filson and Werner (2003a, 2003b), we apply the model to obtain testable hypotheses about the impact of regime type on war onset, duration, and outcomes. However, analysis to date has focused on short wars that last at most one period. In this paper, we consider more complex environments using computational techniques. In doing so, we explore the conditions under which wars endure. The results clarify how the initial distributions of power and benefits, beliefs, and regime type affect when wars begin, how quickly they end, and what deals are made.

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